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Abstract: 
In this thesis, I study a policy process that led into a possibility to ban the cultivation of GMOs in the 
member states of the European Union. In practice, this happened by adding a new article to the 
directive 2001/18/EC. Before the policy process, all the member states were required to allow the 
cultivation of GMOs that were authorized at the EU level. However, this prior “one-size-fits-all 
approach” did not work as planned. A number of member states invoked safeguard clauses to prevent 
the cultivation of the authorized GMO crops, while the pro-GMO countries could not cultivate as 
great of a variety of different GMO crops because other countries were blocking the authorization of 
them. In addition, because of a continuous blocking of new approvals on GMOs, the EU had in place 
an unofficial de facto moratorium of new GMO approvals which was problematic from the point of 
view of the rules of the international trade.  In this thesis, I study the legislative process that led into 
amending the directive 2001/18/EC and to some extent, renationalizing the decision-making on GMO 
cultivation. The focus is on the roles of the main EU decision-making bodies in the process, namely 
the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.  
 
The interest lied in the interplay between the institutions, the expected preferences of them and 
dynamics within the Council. The analysis is done by using three different approaches. The model 
used in this thesis regarding the expected preferences of the institutions is based on Mark. A. Pollack’s 
(2003) perception of the principal-agent analysis in rational choice institutionalism. In addition to 
this, the Parliament’s environmental ambition is analyzed by using typology developed by Burns and 
Carter (2010). The strategy used by the “leader” countries within the Council are analyzed by using 
the classification by Liefferink and Andersen (1998). Key material for this research consists of the 
official drafting documents of the directive, as well as journalistic reports. The method of the thesis 
is an intrinsic case study. The case that is studied is the policy process 2010-2015 that led to member 
states’ right to ban the cultivation of GMO crops in their territory. The decision was made under the 
rules of the co-decision procedure.  
 
The analysis revealed a political environment unfavorable to the continuance of the centralized 
approach. The Commission and the Parliament both acted in a counterintuitive manner throughout 
the policy process as they are generally believed to be both pro-integration and for maximizing 
competences, both for themselves and for the Union as a whole. A slightly deeper look into the history 
of the food-related risk regulation, the prevalent political environment of the time and the policy 
documents provide a few possible reasons for their actions such as increased Euroscepticism, that has 
also in the past affected in a similar manner the Commission. In addition, the analysis revealed that 
the Parliament demonstrated pro-environmental preferences, as it made pro-environmental 
amendments to the initial proposal for the directive despite many of them being blocked by the two 
other institutions. Still, the Parliament was able to ‘green’ the proposal, even though the final text 
was closer to the common position of the Council. Within the Council, a pushing effect of certain 





Environmental policy has developed remarkably in the European Union during the last four decades. 
At first, European integration was mainly an economic project meant to enhance economic 
cooperation between European countries in the war-torn continent. As time passed, member states of 
the EU and its early forms started to co-operate in an increasing number of policy areas other than 
economic, including the environment (Knill & Liefferink 2013). As economic activity often leads to 
environmental problems, it has been a natural step to include issues relating to environmental 
protection into the EU’s agenda. In general, most of the environmental issues are intertwined with 
other policy areas, such as the internal market (Peterson & Bomberg 1999). Today, environmental 
policy is likely one of the most Europeanized policy areas, which means that the EU’s environmental 
policy has a significant impact on national environmental policies and limits considerably the policy 
choices available at the member state level. 
One of the environmental policy issues in which the EU has extended its competencies is GMO 
policy. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines GMO foods as “organisms (i.e. plants, 
animals or micro-organisms) in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does 
not occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination” (WHO 2014). EU’s competencies in this 
policy sphere cover issues such as the traceability and labelling of GMOs (Regulation (EC) 
1830/2003), cultivation of GMOs (Directive 2001/18/EC and 2015/412) and the use of genetically 
modified food and feed (Regulation (EC) 1829/2003). As other environmental issues, GMO issues 
have strong connections to other policy fields, such as internal market, agriculture and food-related 
risk regulation.  
What makes GMO issues slightly different from many other environmental issues, however, is the 
importance of the EU’s GMO policy to transatlantic relations. The EU is often called a ‘global 
precautionary superpower’ when it comes to environmental policy issues, and the issue of GMOs is 
no exception (see for example Tiberghien 2009). EU’s precautionary approach to GMOs has caused 
tensions between the EU and the United States and has led to a dispute through the World Trade 
Organization in 2003 (WTO 2003). The USA has interpreted the EU’s reluctant stance towards 
GMOs as a form of protectionism since banning the harmfulness of the GMOs is scientifically 
unfounded.  More recently, GMOs have been an important topic in the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. The fears have been expressed over the possibility that 
the TTIP could force the EU to accept a wider use of GMOs and open the markets for hormone-
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treated beef. These fears have been overturned by the Commission (European Commission 2016), 
which acts as a negotiator on behalf of the EU, however, this has not appeased the concerns of citizens 
and NGOs.    
One of the recent developments in the EU’s GMO policy has been a decision to grant the member 
states the right to ban the cultivation of GMOs in their territory. The institutional discussion of the 
proposal took five years, illustrating not only the complexity of issues related to GMO cultivation, 
but also the difficulties of reconciling different national and institutional interests. Before this policy 
process came to a close, the EU had a centralized approach to approving GMO crops for cultivation. 
In this centralized approach, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was responsible for 
assessing GMO crops. If the EFSA concluded the assessed GMO crops to be safe, member states 
were expected to allow the cultivation of them in their territories.  
However, this is not how the situation was in practice. Some member states such as Italy, Austria and 
Germany were not willing to accept certain GMO crops for cultivation, even though the approval for 
the cultivation had already been granted and invoked the safeguard clauses provided in the legislation 
to ban the cultivation. In addition to that, some member states continuously blocked the approvals on 
new GMO crops even though the EFSA had deemed them safe. This was problematic as the pro-
GMO countries were not able to cultivate as great of a variety of different GMO crops due to the 
blocking of authorization by other countries. Moreover, because of the continuous blocking of new 
approvals on GMOs, the EU had in place an unofficial de facto moratorium of new GMO approvals 
which was potentially violating the rules of international trade.   
Put simply, before the policy process, the EU member states were required to permit the cultivation 
of GMO crops that were authorized on the EU level, whereas after the policy process, the member 
states that wished to opt out were allowed to. This means that in this policy process, power was taken 
back from the EU level to the national level, which is rare in the EU-context. In the past, the notion 
has been that there is only one way and that is towards deeper integration or an “ever closer union”. 
As envisaged in the Lisbon Treaty, this policy process showed that the policy process can go 
backwards and powers can be taken back to the member state level. 
As one can imagine, the legislative process was prolonged, messy and emotional. The debates in the 
European Parliament (hereafter ‘The Parliament’) alone shed light onto the strong emotional context 
of the issue. Elizabeth Köstinger, the European People’s Party Group’s negotiator, delineated that 
“every MEP had a personal opinion on the topic, ranging from fierce rejection of GMO to avid 
defence, thereby reflecting a considerable rift between member states’ positions” (EurActiv 
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20.4.2015). The strong emotional context and especially the differences between the member state 
opinions on the issue made it also difficult to reach an agreement.  It is not far-fetched to claim that 
this policy process was one of the most contested ones in the environmental policy sphere in the 
2010s.  
Other scholars have shown interest towards this policy process. For example, Sara Poli has carried 
out a practical examination of different features of the proposal in two of her articles (Poli 2015; Poli 
2013). Randour et al. (2014) have asked why the Commission, generally believed to normally behave 
as “a competence-maximizer”, acts in a counterintuitive manner in the process. Charlotte Burns 
(2012, 341) has made a historical institutional analysis on what led to this deadlock situation, in other 
words how the EU’s policy on biotechnology became “locked into a sub-optimal path, with a 
fractured regulatory system and limited release of new crops onto the market.” However, insofar, 
scholars have not used the principal-agent model and other preference-based approaches to make 
sense of the legislative process. Analysing the process through the preference-based theoretical 
framework and focusing on the actions of the main decision-making institutions provides 
considerable help in making sense of it. The approaches that are used are presented next. 
In the EU studies, the principal-agent model is used to study the interactions between the EU 
institutions. In this thesis, the focus is placed on three of them: The Commission, the Parliament and 
the Council. These three are also the main decision-making bodies under the co-decision procedure. 
In Pollack’s version of the principal-agent model, the assumption is that supranational institutions 
(including the Parliament and the Commission) are having pro-integration and competence-
maximizing preferences. These agents can act upon these preferences in the limits set by their 
principal, the Council (Pollack 2003). Already, neo-functionalists believed that these supranational 
institutions are “engines of integration” (see for example Haas 1958), and there is also evidence that 
in practice, the supranational institutions have acted upon these preferences in actual decision-making 
situations (Pollack 2003). By doing a careful case study analysis, which takes account the different 
contextual factors in the political environment, we can find reasons as to why (or why not) the 
institutions are not acting upon these preferences. Above all, the principal-agent model sets out a clear 
framework for analysis that is based on what we already know about institutions and their preferences 
in the EU context. 
However, as Hix and others have pointed out, the EU institutions have multiple interests (Hix 1994). 
Even though I agree with Pollack that the pro-integration and competence-maximizing preferences 
are more consistent and predictable (Pollack 1998, 219), EU literature has provided convincing proof 
of an existence of other preferences. In a number of cases, the European Parliament has acted as “pro-
7 
 
environmental actor” (see for example Burns et al. 2013). In regards to the Council, this sort of strong 
consistent environment-related preferences is not detected. Instead, scholars have argued that the 
environmental leader-laggard dimension has been said to explain far the dynamics within the 
Environment Council (Weale et al. 2000, 94; Wurzel 2014). In other words, the Council in its entirety 
does not necessarily have pro-environmental preferences, rather, the individual ’green’ member states 
are responsible for advocating more ambitious policy initiatives within the Environment Council.  
What is common to all these approaches and expectations presented, is that the interest lies on the 
preferences of different actors and how these preferences affect decision-making. Using the 
knowledge of the environmental preferences of the Parliament and the dynamics within the 
Environment Council in the analysis makes it more nuanced without losing the clarity provided by 
the main approach used in the thesis, the principal-agent model.  
The following questions are what this thesis aims to answer: 
 
1. What were the preferences of the EU institutions in the decision-making process and what  was the 
relative influence of these institutions? 
2. Does the leader-laggard dimension sufficiently explain the dynamics within the Environment 
Council? 
3. What explains the outcome of the legislative process? 
 
Concerning the first question, I have formulated two hypotheses: 
 
1. "The Commission and the Parliament, both have pro-integrationist and competence-maximizing 
preferences during the decision-making process of the GMO directive." 
2. "The Parliament has pro-environmental preferences during the decision-making process of the 
GMO directive.” 
 
Whereas concerning the second question, I have formulated one hypothesis: 
 
3. The leader-laggard dimension explains the dynamics among member states within the Environment 
Council.” 
 
The model used in this thesis is based on Mark. A. Pollack’s (2003) perception of the principal-agent 
analysis in rational choice institutionalism. The Parliament’s environmental ambition is analyzed by 
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using typology developed by Burns and Carter (2010). The strategy used by the ‘leader’ countries is 
analyzed using the classification by Liefferink and  Andersen (1998). Key material for this research 
consists of the official drafting documents of the directive, as well as journalistic reports. The method 
of the thesis is an intrinsic case study. The case that is studied is the policy process 2010-2015 that 
led to member states’ right to ban the cultivation of GMO crops in their territory. The analysis reveals 
a political environment unfavorable to the continuance of the centralized system. 
 
1.1 Research questions and their motivation 
 
The European Union is an important player in global environmental politics and aims to play a 
frontrunner role in many issue areas (Delreux 2013, 302). Probably the most important environmental 
policy field today in which the EU is also often perceived as a leader is global climate change politics 
(Wurzel & Connelly 2011). It was the negotiations for international treaties to protect the 
stratospheric ozone layer that enabled the EU to establish this international “actorness” (Vogler 
1999). At first, the EU faced difficulties before being accepted as an actor in global environmental 
politics, however, today, its recognition is uncontested (Delreux 2013, 290). The EU’s competences 
in the field of environmental policy have grown because of various treaty changes which have granted 
more competences to it. Today, the EU has a broad range of internal environmental legislation, which 
is likely the strictest supranational environmental policy system in the world. This policy system has 
enabled the EU to lead by example (Delreux 2013, 302).  Therefore, in addition to environmental 
policy-making in the EU, internal dynamics is also significant in regards to the EU’s role in global 
environmental politics. 
This study started with an interest in the current dynamics in environmental policy-making in the 
European Union, and specifically, the dynamics between the EU institutions. Choosing a suitable 
case for the study started with a search from the EU database. The search options were the following: 
directives from years 2013-2015, using the search word “environment.” The number of directives to 
choose from proved to be surprisingly small, however, this was not due to search options. Rather, 
there has been a considerably long four-year period of almost complete regulatory inactivity after the 
year 2010 in the environmental policy field (Steinebach & Knill 2016).  
One plausible explanation for this inactivity is the rise of Euroscepticism. Also in the past, the EU 
has reacted to the rise of Euroscepticism by diminishing the number of directives that they produce. 
As put by Peterson and Bomberg (1999, 176), “by the time the Maastrich Treaty was finally ratified 
9 
 
in 1993, public interest in environmental issues had begun to wane” and “new popular doubts about 
the European project was one important factor motivating the Santer Commission to try ‘to do less 
but do it better”. More recently, Politico has assessed the legacy of Barroso’s second Commission 
and concluded that during the term, the Commission was less environmentally ambitious than during 
the first. The Commission, and particularly Catherine Day, the Commission’s secretary general (and 
a former director-general for Environment), was blamed by environmental interest groups of being 
personally responsible for hindering various proposals drafted by the environmental department. The 
Commission insiders explained this as “a response to growing Euroscepticism and the negative mood 
about ‘red tape’” (Politico 11.1.2014).  
In addition, after Juncker’s Commission took office in 2014, environmentalists have voiced concerns 
over a small role for environmental policy in the new Commission. In his article “a post-austerity 
European Commission: no role for environmental policy?” Čavoški has assessed the current state of 
affairs in the environmental policy field by making an overview on relevant documents of the 
Commission and come into a conclusion that these concerns are not without a foundation. (Čavoški, 
2015.) For instance, the word “environment” is used in Juncker’s Political Guidelines for the new 
Commission four times, and of these four times, only once to refer to the natural environment. The 
remainder refers to investment, regulatory and business environments. (European Commission 
2014b).As Čavoški puts it, “as expected the main focus of the new Commission is a post-austerity 
agenda to stabilise national economies and boost jobs growth and investment”. (Čavoški 2015, 501). 
Were it due to Euroscepticism or economic situation, the interest in environmental issues has seemed 
to decrease since the Barroso’s Second Commission as also the small number of environment-related 
directives during the years of 2013-2015 indicated.      
The original search resulted in three suitable directives to choose from. Following a media search, I 
decided to focus on the EU Directive 2015/412 amending the Directive 2001/18/EC as it dealt with 
the decision of member states to restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GMOs in their countries. 
Furthermore, it appeared to cause the most tension, which would therefore be most interesting and 
suitable in studying the interactions among the EU institutions. Unlike the other two, the directive 
required two readings to pass. The speed, however, does not always signal how controversial the issue 
has been. In fact, De Ruiter’s and Neuhold’s (2012, 552) review on relevant literature on decision-
making procedures indicated that a fast-track procedure is often used especially in highly 
controversial cases. Therefore, a fast policy process is not necessarily indicating that a case was 
uncontested. Nevertheless, relevant media indicated that the GMO directive was in fact more 
controversial than the other options. That was also why this directive was chosen: a more 
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controversial policy process would more likely reveal interesting issues concerning the inter-
institutional relations and the preferences of different actors than a less contested one.  
This Directive is not only a suitable case to study the dynamics of the EU institutions but also 
interesting in its own right. Basically, the Directive is not only about granting member states the right 
to ban the cultivation of GMOs in their territory but also about taking decision-making powers back 
from the EU level to the member state level. The act has been inspired by the principle of subsidiarity 
and is the first “internal market” act in which the EU returns decision-making powers back to the 
national level. According to Sara Poli, this “has a high symbolic value for the whole EU integration 
process. For a long time, there was a presumption that the latter was a one-way street towards the 
increase of the EU competence. After the Lisbon Treaty, it was made clear that in areas of shared 
competence, such a presumption does not apply anymore” (Poli 2015, 562-563.) In addition, the 
Directive shows that the EU is continuing with its precautionary approach to GMOs. As a result, 
finding out the dynamics leading into the final decision is intriguing.  
The principal-agent was chosen as the model sets out a clear framework for analysis that is based on 
what we already know about institutions and their preferences in the EU context. It helped to ask the 
right questions, such as: are the EU institutions acting in a way that we are expecting from them, and 
if not, why? I also chose to study the environmental credentials of the Parliament since the literature 
provided convincing proof of the existence of this preference. At first glance, in this case, the pro-
environmental and pro-integration preferences seem to conflict with one another which made it 
compelling to pose a question: in a conflict situation, upon which preference would the Parliament 
decide to act? This query is embedded in the current study questions and hypotheses presented earlier.  
The leader-laggard dimension is often described as going a long way in explaining the dynamics 
within the Environment Council. In this policy process, the activity of one of the ‘greener’ member 
states, namely Austria’s role, was especially significant. Therefore, the focus was put on the strategy 
used by this member state.  
 
1.2 Important concepts 
 
First off, it is good to start by addressing what is meant by “GMOs”. World Health Organization 
(WHO) defines GMO foods as “organisms (i.e. plants, animals or micro-organisms) in which the 
genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating and/or 
11 
 
natural recombination” (WHO 2014). It is most likely the “unnatural nature” and public fears over 
GMOs that have led the media to sometimes refer to GMOs as “Frankenstein food”. Frankenstein, 
the book known by all and written by Mary Shelley, tells a story of a young scientist, Victor 
Frankenstein, who creates a new form of life using unconventional methods. As the story goes, 
everything does not go as planned and the creature turns out to be a dangerous monster. The story is 
often understood as reflection of the fears towards the power and danger of science. The message that 
the story is sending can be summarized as follows: we should not try to force what is not natural 
because it can cause disaster. The “Frankenstein food” metaphor is catching quite well the public 
unease about GMOs and this is why it is also used in the title of this study.  
The other important concepts in this thesis are borrowed from the political science literature. One of 
these concepts is the word “policy”. According to Gunn & Hogwood the most commonly encountered 
usage of the term is in the context of broad statements about a government’s ‘economic policy’ or its 
‘social policy’. Further, within these broad labels, there are also more specific references to the 
government’s policy towards different policy areas, such as housing policy or policy regarding the 
EU. What is actually been described here appears to be ‘fields’ of governmental activity and 
involvement. (Gunn & Hogwood 1984, 13-15.) 
For the purpose of this study, this definition is too broad. However, the term ‘policy’ should neither 
be understood too narrowly, for example, in everyday usage where the distinction between ‘policy’ 
and ‘decision’ is often overlooked. As Gunn and Hogwood write, policy is larger than a decision and 
“a policy usually involves series of more specific decisions, sometimes in a ‘rational’ sequence (e.g. 
deciding the best way of proceeding; deciding to legislate etc.)” (Gunn and Hogwood 1984, 19). 
Verluis et al. (2011, 11) agree that policy is more than a single rule of law and it can also refer to 
inaction such as the decision to stick with the status quo. 
Versluis et al (2011) perceive policy as “something bigger” than particular decisions. They define 
policy as follows: “Policy refers to a deliberate course of (in-)action selected from among available 
alternatives to achieve a certain outcome” (Versluis et al. 2011, 11). The other main element in this 
definition is that policy is usually meant to address a certain problem and therefore is meant to achieve 
a certain outcome. In this context, ‘deliberate course of action’ refers to ‘purposiveness’ of some sort 
(Versluis et al. 2011, 11). Often the basic distinction is made with the word “policy” and “politics”. 
As Lasswell famously put it, politics refers to the process, by which a group of people determine 
“who gets what, when and how” (Lasswell 1958). In this context, politics refers to the wider process 
in which policies are created. In short, the concept of “policy” is distinct from other related concepts 
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such as “decision” and “politics”. It is an action aiming at a certain outcome that is larger than a single 
decision but smaller than a whole policy field.  
Next, after gaining an understanding of the meaning of the concept “policy” and how it differs from 
politics and a single decision, it would be worth exploring the concept of “policy analysis”.  
According to Dye (1976, 1), policy analysis is about “finding out what governments do, why they do 
it and what difference it makes” and even though more elaborate definitions of policy analysis can be 
found in the academic literature, they pretty much boil down to the same thing - the description and 
explanation of the causes and consequences of government activity”. However, in the politics of the 
European Union, governments are not the only actors involved. Surely national governments are 
playing an important role in the decision-making processes but supranational institutions are as well. 
However, in case we replace the term “government” by another broader term which also includes the 
EU institutions, the definition of policy analysis by Dye is applicable in this context. In contrast to 
Dye’s definition, Dunn emphasizes the strong linkages to academic literature and theories, 
categorizing “policy analysis” as a problem solving-discipline that draws on theories, methods and 
substantive findings of the behavioral and social sciences, social professions and both social and 
political philosophy (Dunn 2004, 1).  
In sum, policy is defined here as something bigger than a single decision yet something different than 
a process through which people make certain choices (politics). Put simply, it is action that is 
designated to result in an outcome (either by sticking with status quo or moving forward), among a 
number of possible choices. Now, after defining the key concepts, it is time to observe environmental 











2. Environmental policy and decision-making in the European Union 
 
2.1 Environmental policy in the European Union 
 
At first, environmental issues were not at the core of European integration. Instead, the word 
'environment' was not even mentioned in the Treaty of Rome that established the European Economic 
Community in 1957. The co-operation in the early steps of the community we today known as the 
European Union was mainly about boosting the economy and repairing the relations in war-torn 
Europe. Considering this, the environmental policy of the EU has developed in a remarkable fashion 
during the last four decades. Today, it is not possible to understand the national environmental 
policies of the member states without understanding the environmental policy in the EU (Knill & 
Liefferink 2013, 13-30). The European Union has developed “an increasingly dense network of 
legislation” which covers areas of environmental protection such as air and water pollution, 
management of waste, protection of consumers, as well as wildlife and countryside protection; and 
how, considering the legal and institutional conditions that were in place at the end of the 1960s, 
developments of this kind could hardly be expected (Knill & Liefferink 2013, 13).    
Environmental policy is one of the most integrated policy areas in the EU. The impact of the EU on 
environmental policy is so remarkable that today almost all national policy in this field is made by, 
or in close association with, the EU (Jordan 2002), making environmental policy highly 
Europeanized. For instance, in one of the most comprehensive cross-sectoral analyses of 
Europeanization in the UK, Bache and Jordan (2006) found out that environmental had been the most 
Europeanized of five policy areas covered (the others being foreign affairs, competition, monetary 
and regional policy). The high Europeanization of the environmental policy means that the policy 
choices in the European Union level limit considerably the decision-making options available in the 
member states. 
Peterson and Bomberg characterizes environmental policy as “one of the EU’s most diverse and 
crowded policy realms, populated by a staggering array of actors and interests. By its very nature, 
decision-making on environmental issues is highly technical and driven by scientific expertise” 
(Peterson and Bomberg 1999, 173). In the case of the GMO directive, these elements are especially 
apparent. The GMO policy-making in the EU involves farmers, business groups (both within the EU 
and in the US), environmental organizations, scientists, and consumers among others.  The scientific 
assessment of the safety of GMOs is especially important in this case.  
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Not only the GMO issue, but also a broad scope of most environmental issues has become 
increasingly intertwined with other sectoral issues, especially those surrounding agriculture, 
cohesion, transport and the internal market (Peterson & Bomberg 1999). The GMO issue is no 
exception. Pollack and Shaffer delineate the nature of biotechnology as ”an issue that is inherently 
multi-sectoral, requiring horizontal coordination across a range of issue areas; inherently multi-level, 
requiring vertical coordination across the national, supranational, and international arenas; and 
inherently concerned with risk regulation, requiring difficult, highly contested decisions about the 
role of science and politics in the assessment and management of risk to modern European societies” 
(Pollack and Shaffer 2005, 330-331).  
Even though biotechnology has strong connections to other policy fields, and can be treated as a trade, 
internal market and risk regulation issue to name a few, the Commission’s Directorate-General held 
responsible for the issue has been the one designated to environmental affairs. The new legislation 
has been negotiated and adopted predominantly by the Council of Environment Ministers, jointly 
with the European Parliament. This is largely due to the potential of environmental effects, and 
particularly the effects associated with the release of GMOs (ie. seeds and crops) (Pollack and Shaffer 
2005, 331). 
The linkage between environmental issues and the single market become especially apparent when 
one studies the different phases of environmental policy. The development of EU environmental 
policy can be broken down into three phases. In the first phase (1972-1987), the legal justification for 
taking environmental measures were trade policy motives. At that time, the focus was mainly on 
harmonization of different environmental regulations that could disturb the completion of the single 
market (Knill & Liefferink 2013, 28-29). Due to an increasing number of cross-border environmental 
issues and the active role of individual member states (Andersen and Liefferink 1997a), “a respectable 
programme of often very ambitious measures and activities emerged despite a weak legal and 
institutional basis” (Knill & Liefferink 2013, 28). At the same time, environmental policy started to 
emerge as “an independent policy domain,” separated from the area of economic integration (Knill 
& Liefferink 2013, 28-29).  
In the second phase (1987-1991), the legal and institutional settings were strengthened and the 
common environmental policy was developed further. The Single European Act (SEA) set out 
formally what was already reality in everyday policy-making. The SEA raised environmental policy 
to one of the official fields of activity of the Community. The SEA laid down the aims, principles and 
decision-making procedures for environmental policy, which strengthened considerably the EU’s 
environmental policy authority. The SEA also brought along other important institutional changes. 
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For instance, the treaty introduced a novel decision-making procedure that was used when the EU 
decided on the environmental issues relevant to the single market. From that day on, decisions could 
be done in the Council of Ministers if a qualified majority was reached. It was commonly expected 
that this change would mean that the EU would start to agree on more stringent environmental 
regulations, which would go “beyond the lowest common denominator,” however, this proved to be 
only partially true (Knill & Liefferink 2013, 28-29).  
The third phase (post 1992) can be characterized by two opposing trends. On the one hand, during 
this time institutional and legal arrangements were updated and revised further, especially in the 
Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, as well through a creation of the European Economic Area 
(EEA). On the other hand, at this time environmental issues seemed to have lost a momentum on the 
European agenda (Knill & Liefferink 2013, 28-29).  
According to Bomberg and Peterson (1999), the increased activity of the EU in environmental issues 
was not a result of rising green awareness or the increased awareness of global environmental issues.  
Rather, the reason was the will to eliminate trade distortions between the member states in the 
common market. Very diverse national regulations on industrial pollution could mean that the 
countries polluting more, or ‘dirty states’, could profit economically at the expense of countries with 
more advanced environmental regulations (Lodge 1989, 320).     
In recent history, a policy development worth mentioning is the Lisbon Treaty entering into force in 
2009. This policy process leading into the signing of the Lisbon Treaty were, according to Benson 
and Adelle  (2013, 32), characterized “by significant speculation, and indeed, heated controversy over 
its alleged impacts on EU politics, policy and governance.” Now after several years have passed, it 
has become possible for scholars to analyze the actual impacts of the Lisbon Treaty to day-to-day 
policy-making. Benson and Adelle (2013, 32) summarize the Lisbon Treaty’s impact on the 
environment as ‘comme ci, comme ca’ – neither good nor bad. In some respects, the EU gained 
power, whereas in other respects, the Lisbon Treaty weakened it (Benson & Adelle 2013, 32). One 
of the notable changes that the Lisbon Treaty brought along was the co-decision procedure being 
extended to new policy areas, meaning that the Parliament gained more power vis-à-vis to the 





2.2 Decision-making system of the European Union 
 
In this section, I will present the functions of the European Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament which form the core of the executive and legislative bodies in the decision-making system 
of the EU. Furthermore, I am explaining what roles these institutions play in the decision-making 
processes in relation to environmental politics. 
 
2.2.1 The Council 
 
The Council is an intergovernmental body of the union which is composed of ministers from the 
governments of the member states. Decisions that the Council make are first prepared in working 
groups and Coreper meetings. The final decisions are reached in the ministerial meetings. The 
Council of the EU is a single legal entity but it meets in several different ‘configurations’ that focus 
on certain subjects such as agriculture and transport (Gallagher et al. 2011, 132-134).  
Each member state holds a Presidency of the Council at their turn and the post rotates each 6 months. 
According to Gallagher et al. (2011, 132), because of the shortness of the term, the role is not a very 
important one and the Presidency cannot “begin any new initiative to fruition” but at best, it can 
“speed up or slow-pedal some of those projects already on the books, and perhaps introduce initiatives 
that it expects might be carried forward”. Nonetheless, in the decision-making situations, the 
Presidency may to some extent “pull decision outcomes toward their favored policy position” 
(Thomson 2008, 611-613). Therefore, the Presidency also gives some political power.  
The Council is the decision-making center of the EU and it possesses both executive and legislative 
powers. There are two central ways in which the Commission exercises these executive powers. It 
sets the long-term policy goals and delegates certain powers to the Commission so that these goals 
can be reached. These two tasks relate to the political (leadership) dimension of executive powers. 
Secondly, heads of government set the medium-term policy agenda for the union and monitor the 
national macroeconomic policies of the states through the “open method of coordination”. These two 
executive powers that the Council possess relate to the administrative (implementation) aspect. The 
member states have the responsibility to implement EU legislation through their national 
bureaucracies. In addition, the member state governments manage the everyday administration of EU 
policies together with the Commission through the comitology system (Hix 2005, 31). When it comes 
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to the legislative powers, one of the main tasks of the Council is to decide on the new legislation. 
Today, in most cases jointly with the Parliament, as the co-decision procedure has become the main 
decision-making procedure in the EU. Next, it is time to take an overview to the Council’s role, 
internal functioning, and the dynamics within the environmental policy sphere.  
 
The Council and environment 
 
As explained earlier, there are different Council formations (made up of ministers responsible for 
particular policy areas) and one of these is the Environment Council. The Environment Council is 
responsible for EU environment policy, including environmental protection, prudent use of resources 
and the protection of human health. Moreover, it deals with international environmental issues, 
especially in the area of climate change. According to Wurzel, among different actors, the 
Environmental Council is the most important one shaping external environment policy. Over the 
years the number of Environmental Council meetings has increased significantly which indicates the 
increased importance of environmental matters in the Union’s agenda (Wurzel 2014, 75-77). 
The environmental leader-laggard dimension has been said to explain the dynamics within the 
Environment Council (Weale et al. 2000, 94; Wurzel 2014). This dimension has not only been used 
to explain the dynamics within the EU, but also in the international policy sphere (Sbragia 1996; 
Liefferink and Andersen 1997b). In this view, member states can be divided to ‘leaders’ who push 
for higher environmental standards or ‘laggards’ who, for one reason or another, oppose raising the 
environmental standards. The proponents of this view put countries such as Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands, and from the newer member states Austria, Finland and Sweden to the leader 
category (Weale et al. 2000). However, scholars have started to increasingly question whether 
Germany belongs in the group (Pehle, H. 1997) and many associate the UK with the group (Héritier 
et al. 1996; Liefferink & Andersen 1997b).  
Environmentally progressive ‘pioneers’, no matter how exactly defined, have indeed been important 
pushers for more advanced environmental policies. These countries have sought to take their own 
domestic, ambitious regulatory solutions to the other policy levels. This fulfills two purposes. Firstly, 
being a pioneer is often costly: having more stringent environmental regulation tends to mean 
increased costs for the economic actors within the country. Therefore, making others take similar 
costly measures would diminish the competitive disadvantages for the industry. Secondly, sometimes 
the country benefits considerably from the transboundary action. Sometimes transboundary flows of 
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pollution are hindering the country to fulfill its own national environmental policy goals, and 
therefore getting others to follow more stringent environmental regulation might prove to be crucial 
in the process of meeting the countries’ own goals (Liefferink and Andersen 1998, 254). 
While scholars have agreed more widely on which countries should be perceived as leaders, more 
disagreements exist when it comes to the laggards. One common example is the UK, which gained a 
questionable reputation as a “dirty man of Europe” in the 1970’s. Also, the cohesion countries and 
Italy are suggested to belong to the laggard category. Another more nuanced classification agrees on 
the countries which belong to the leader category, however, it classifies Italy, France and the UK as 
belonging to the “intermediate category” and puts the rest of the countries in the “laggard” category 
(Weale et al. 2000, 94-95). However, as mentioned earlier, there are many who would put the UK in 
the “leader” category. Recently, for example, the UK has clearly been an ambitious actor in climate 
politics, repeatedly advocating higher emission targets than most other member states, thereby 
increasing ambition of the EU’s longer-term targets. In addition, the UK influenced the choice to 
adapt the emission trading scheme as a key policy instrument in the European Union, as it had a 
similar system in place on the national level (Rayner and Moore 2016).  
However, it is often argued that rather than there being a static division between the leaders and 
laggards, the categorization of each country is actually variable on a case-by-case basis (see for 
example Weale et al. 2000, 94-95). A quantity, large-N study on the environmental leader-laggard 
countries in the member states conducted by Knill et al. (2012, 36) is also supporting this common 
notion. This is also the starting point in this thesis: instead of automatically assuming some member 
states to be either “laggards” or “leaders,” the analysis starts with an open mind.    
Liefferink and Andersen (1998) have studied the strategies used by ‘green’ member states. These 
“environmental pioneers” are having slightly different strategies to advance their policy preferences, 
and the authors have distinguished between four of them. These strategies should not be taken as 
static as a country may change its strategy over time. Moreover, in practice the strategy may be a 
combination of two or more (Liefferink & Andersen 1998). This classification is also used in this 
thesis to characterize the pusher action of Austria.  This table “presents a scheme according to which 
a member state can act as a ‘pioneer’ in principally four different ways, with varying emphasis on the 





Table 1: Strategies of influencing EU environmental policy 
Forerunner: Purposeful Incremental 
Pusher:   
Direct a) Pusher-by-example b) Constructive pusher 
Indirect c) Defensive d) Opt-outer 
Source: Liefferink and Andersen (1998, 256.) 
In this classification, a ‘forerunner’ is defined “as a member state which is ‘ahead’ of EU 
environmental policy in the sense of having more developed and more advanced policies with a higher 
level of protection” (Liefferink and Andersen 1998, 256). The table makes a distinction between 
forerunner policies developed which are “a more incremental, historical process” and those which 
have been “adapted more purposefully with an eye to the EU policy-making process” (ibid). The first 
“pusher type” on the table, ‘pusher by example’ is an actor that engages into unilateral action to 
influence EU environmental policy-making (ibid.) A good example of this includes Denmark’s 
decision to introduce a CO2 tax, the idea behind it being a push for an EU-wide CO2 tax (Andersen 
and Liefferink 1996, 114-115).   
The second type of forerunner (b) has achieved its position incrementally without considering the EU 
process and oftentimes principally for domestic reasons. Yet this type of member state might still 
seek to push for stricter environmental standards by forming coalitions either with the Commission’s 
experts or the other member states. As in the table, this type of strategy can be characterized as a 
“constructive pusher,” since the country using this strategy is “oriented towards finding a 
compromise, possibly at the expense of slightly lower EU standards than domestic ones” (Liefferink 
and Andersen 1998, 256-257).  As an example, Andersen and Liefferink give the influence exercised 
by Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands in regards to the ambitious level of waste water treatment 
that was decided in the urban waste water directive. The decision made in the directive followed to a 
great extent the standards already achieved in these countries years ago (Liefferink and Andersen 
1998, 257). 
The third strategy is defined as “defensive forerunner” since the member state is first and foremost 
interested in protecting its own environment, rather than the environment of the EU as a whole. The 
position has been adopted intentionally, yet the “pushing” of EU policy-making is not done as 
directly. A member state using the strategy is not aiming at presenting its own model as something 
that the EU as a whole should adopt. Instead, oftentimes a pushing effect is due to the EU’s 
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interference in other policy areas, mostly common market policy. Still, the implications for the EU 
can be significant (Liefferink & Andersen 1996, 114-115).  
The fourth strategy is an “opt-outer”. In this strategy, a member state pressures the EU environmental 
policy indirectly, and a country reaches the forerunner position through incremental steps.  Common 
to this category and the latter one, conflicting rules of internal markets and domestic environmental 
standards are resulting in a pushing action of a member state. However, the difference is that the 
domestic standards prove to conflict with the rules governing the internal market unpredictably for 
the country which may make the country to ‘opt out’ (Liefferink and Andersen 1998, 257). 
 
2.2.2 The Commission 
 
The Commission is one of the supranational institutions of the EU, along with the Parliament and the 
Court of Justice.  At first sight, the Commission might look like the “government” of the European 
Union. However, the Commission is more of a hybrid between a government and a civil service as 
the Council also has a governmental role. The Commission is headed by a President and it consists 
of 27 commissioners, one from each country. Each of the commissioners have a specific policy 
jurisdiction (or portfolio) which range from competition to trade, economic and monetary affairs, the 
environment, transport and enlargement (Gallagher et al. 2011, 121-125). 
The Commission has a long list of different responsibilities. Its tasks are to suggest policy ideas for 
the medium-term development of the Union, make initiatives for new legislation and act as an 
arbitrator in the legislative processes. The tasks also include managing the EU budget and overseeing 
the implementation of the primary treaty articles and secondary legislation. In addition, the 
Commission is a representative of the EU in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations (Hix 2011, 
34). To execute these tasks, the Commission is organized in a manner that resembles domestic 
governments. The Commission has a core executive (the College of the Commissioners) that 
concentrates on the political tasks; a bureaucracy (directorates-general) that is responsible for drafting 
the legislation, administrative work and certain regulatory tasks; and a network of quasi-autonomous 
agencies which take care of an array of monitoring and regulatory tasks (Hix 2011, 34).  
The College of Commissioners seek to make decisions by consensus, but it is possible for 
Commissioners to request a vote. Even though a Commissioner would lose a vote, he or she must fall 
in line of the majority in the outer world. Put simply, as in most cabinet government systems, the 
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Commissioners need to follow the principle of ‘collective responsibility’ for the decisions that are 
made. In this respect, and due to the allocation of a portfolio to each Commissioner, the functioning 
of the Commission is similar to the cabinet government systems in the national level (Hix 2011, 35). 
Indeed, the Commission possesses many characteristics of a supranational “government” and the 
member states have delegated important tasks for it. Next, it is time to assess the Commission’s 
relationship to environmental affairs.  
 
The Commission and environment 
 
The Commission has a broad range of functions in the environmental policy sphere and it is engaged 
with environmental governance in numerous ways. As put by Weale et al. (2000, 87), “As an agenda-
setter, the consensus-builder, manager, and the formal initiator of legislation, its presence is largely 
taken as a given at all stages in the European environmental policy process”. Since 1973, the 
Commission has sought to create a coherent environmental policy (Schön-Quinlivan 2014, 106) yet 
it has been said that the Commission has not been successful in creating one, as the environmental 
policy-making is still fairly incoherent (Peterson and Blomberg 1999). Another problem that the 
Commission has faced in the environmental policy sphere is the poor implementation level of the 
environmental policies (Schön-Quinlivan 2014, 109).  
As explained earlier, the Commission consists of twenty-four directorate-generals (DGs), that to some 
extent, are similar to  national ministries. The DG that has the responsibility to draft environmental 
legislation and implementation of policy is DG XI. This DG is separated to directorates that deal with 
general and international affairs, environment, nuclear safety and civil protection, and environmental 
quality and natural resources. Compared to other DGs, it is pretty small and it has a special character 
within the Commission. Still, seen by many as an advocate of environmental matters or “science” 
DG, its leadership throughout the years has by purpose sought to “mainstream” the institution (Weale 
et al. 2000, 89). The DG was set up in 1973 but it did not gain a full Directorate-General status until 
1981 and it played a marginal role within the Commission for a quite some time (Schön-Quinlivan 




2.2.3 The European Parliament 
  
At first, the Parliament’s role was described as “a mere talking shop” but these days it is on equal 
footing with the Council in most of the decision-making situations. For much of its history, it was 
relatively weak. But since the first direct elections in 1979, its powers and status have grown with 
remarkable speed, culminating in the changes agreed upon the Lisbon Treaty (Shackleton 2012, 124). 
The European Parliament’s powers fall into three key areas; it enjoys considerable influence in 
relation to the EU Budget; it has the right to scrutinize, appoint, and dismiss the Commission; and in 
the context of EU law-making, the Parliament also has the right to amend and reject Commission 
proposals for legislation (Gallagher 2011, 1). The Parliament is the EU’s only directly elected 
institution and the empowerment of it has been a way to reduce a democratic deficit of the EU.  
The Parliament is organized into political groups. The groups that are most important are the center-
right European People’s Party (EPP), the center-right Progressive Alliance of European Socialists 
and Democrats (S&D) and the liberal Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), as 
they possess the most seats in the Parliament. Other smaller groups comprise of the Greens, GUE-
NGL, far-right and ‘Eurosceptic’ or nationalist MEPs. As time has passed, the groups have become 
more important and the majority of MEPs vote along their party line, rather than national (Hix et al. 
2007). However, the political parties are slightly less cohesive as they are in the national level, but a 
bit more so than for instance their counterparts in the US Congress (Gallagher 2011, 130). 
In addition, according to Burns (2013, 162), the groups play a crucial role as they “control 
appointments to positions of responsibility and set the EP’s calendar and agenda”. The importance of 
the groups is highlighted by the fact that the non-attached members of the Parliament end up being 
pretty powerless: these members hardly get a chance to be responsible for writing an important report 
or hold a significant position within the Parliament (Corbett et al. 2011, 78). However, much of the 
actual work of the Parliament is carried out in its twenty specialist committees (Gallagher 2011, 130) 
and the Parliament has been frequently described as “an institution composed of strong committees 
and weak parties“ (Burns 2013, 165).  
  
The European Parliament and the environment 
 
The European Parliament has both perceived itself and has also been seen by others as the defender 
of environmental interests. There are many reasons behind the reputation of the European Parliament 
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as the defender of environmental issues. Much of the reputation is largely due to the work of 
Environment Committee, which is also the Committee having one of the heaviest workloads of any 
Parliament committee (see for example Weale et al. 2000, 91-92). The landmark piece of EP’s role 
in environmental policy in the EU is a paper by David Judge published in 1992. In the paper, Judge 
assesses the impact of the EP on environmental policy in the EC and reveals that the impact of the 
EP has been variable (Judge 1992). The heavy workload has also given it a high profile. The 
committee is not solely dealing with environmental issues, but it is also responsible for issues related 
to public health and food safety. With 64 members, the committee is one of the largest committees 
(Burns 2013, 132-151).  
The committee’s leaders have also contributed to the notion. The Committee was led by Ken Collins, 
UK Labor MEP, from 1979 and 1999. During that time, he crafted a formidable reputation for himself 
and the committee as leading entrepreneurs in the field of environmental policy. From 1999 to 2004, 
the leader of the committee changed to Caroline Jackson, who is a conservative MEP also from the 
UK. The reputation of the EP as an 'environmental champion' was maintained during that time. 
However, after 2009, the committee was led my Miroslav Ouzký, a member of the Czech Civic 
Democrats. During his tenure as chair, the reputation of the committee as being a key environmental 
actor felt into abeyance (Burns 2013, 132-151). 
However, there have also been other reasons behind the success of the committee. Secondly, the 
Committee has been able to develop close relations with its partner institutions, especially with DG 
XI (Weale et al. 2000, 92). Thirdly, the Committee is also the place where the Parliament's Green 
MEPs, to the extent to which they have been able to act as a unified group, have sought to advance 
their views. Fourthly, many members of the Committee have initiated their own expert reports into 
environmental issues, and the Environment Committee has embarked on a great many more own-
initiative reports than most other committees (Weale et al. 2000, 92). 
The changes that have taken place in the European Union in the 2000s have likely eroded the role of 
the EP as the defender of these interests. For instance, there has been a shift in norms of decision-
making, the Parliament’s ideological composition has changed, and many eastern European countries 
have joined the EU (Burns 2013, 132-151).  
The approach that is taken here is to look into the ways that these institutions are aiming to change 
this directive. In the article “Is Co-decision Good for the Environment? – An Analysis of the European 
Parliaments Green Credentials” Burns and Carter (2010, 129) use an environmental ambition 
typology to classify the Parliament’s amendment’s environmental ambition. The typology consists of 
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five different classifications: a negative impact, a neutral impact, a marginal impact, a weak 
ecological modernization and a strong ecological modernization. This typology is also used in this 
thesis. 
Classification Meaning 
Negative impact Overall negative impact on the environment – normally a derogation. 
Neutral impact No discernible impact, negative or positive, on the environment – normally an 
editorial or technical amendment. 
A marginal 
impact 
Makes rhetorical commitment to environmental goals, paying lip service to 
key concepts. Vague commitments and promises. Limited environmental 
impact and imposes only minor costs on industry or consumers. 
A weak ecological 
modernization 
Implements weak versions of a coherent ecological modernization strategy. 
Establishes formal methods of achieving policy integration or applying the 
precautionary principle. Imposes or tightens deliverable targets, standards or 




Applies principles such as binding policy integration, the legal application of 
the precautionary principle or the use of the polluter pays principle. Makes 
commitments to international environmental agreements. Adopts stringent 
targets, standards and timescales, backed by extensive monitoring systems and 
sanctions. May require extensive reform of political and economic institutions, 
including signiﬁcant democratization of institutions and mechanisms. 
 
Source: Burns and Carter (2010, 129). 
 
2.2.4. Co-decision procedure 
      
The co-decision procedure has become the primary decision-making procedure in the European 
Union. Under the procedure, all legislation adopted needs to be approved by both the Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament. A Conciliation Committee is held in case the two 
parties are unable to approve legislation, like defined in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, article 294, hereinafter “TFEU”). The policy process studied 
in the thesis was also adopted under this procedure after two readings. Under the co-decision 
procedure and since the Parliament and the Council decide jointly, the EU works in a truly bicameral 
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fashion, such as on a national level (Corbett et al., 2003; Crombez, 2000; Tsebelis and Money, 1997). 
The procedure was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty, and later the scope of legislation adopted 
under this procedure was extended to most policy areas; and today, most environmental legislation is 
adopted under this procedure (Burns & Carter 2010, 138). However, there are still significant policy 
areas in which the power rests on the hands of the member states. These notable exceptions are policy 
issues concerning economic and monetary union, which are still decided under the cooperation 
procedure (Phinnemore & McGowan 2010, 60). The co-decision has brought along some notable 
changes to the decision-making system of the EU and since it is the procedure under which the GMO 
directive studied here is created, a short overview to the debate is worth taking.  
The introduction of the procedure resulted in a vivid debate over the Parliament’s legislative powers 
under it. On the one hand, some scholars argued that the procedure had strengthened the Parliament’s 
influence (Moser 1997a; Scully 1997), while others argued the contrary (Steunenberg 1994; Tsebelis 
and Garrett 1996). Tsebelis with his collaborators have argued that the net effect of the co-decision 
procedure has not been a positive one regardless of the Parliament’s right of absolute veto mainly 
because the Parliament has lost its conditional agenda-setting power that it had under the co-operation 
procedure (Tsebelis 1994, 1996, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 1997, 2000; Garrett and Tsebelis 2001). 
Before, the Parliament made proposals, which once accepted by the Commission, were easier to the 
Council to accept than to modify. This was because in order to accept, reaching the qualified majority 
in the Council was sufficient, while to modify, the Council had to reach unanimity (Tsebelis 1994). 
This argument was criticized by other game theorists (Scully 1997; Moser 1997b; Crombez 1997, 
2000a) as well as practitioners and other academics (Corbett 2000, 2001; Rittberger 2000). However, 
today, after the reform of the co-decision procedure, the widely accepted notion is that the co-decision 
has increased the EP’s power compared to cooperation (e.g. see Crombez et al. 2006b; Hix 2002).  
According to Rasmussen (2012, 747), the changes that the co-decision procedure brought along “have 
affected the balance of power between the EU institutions and internal decision-making within these 
institutions in a fundamental way”. Even though the Parliament and the Council would not act as 
equal co-legislators in practice, after introducing the procedure, the EU has started to function in a 
more bicameral fashion, meaning that the Council needs to consider the EP’s views much more than 
before (ibid). The procedure has clearly empowered the Parliament, and made the Parliament more 
than “a mere talking shop” as its earlier role has been described in the EU literature numerous times.  
As the time passed on, the focus of academic discussion shifted from the relative influence of the 
Parliament in different legislative procedures to the relative distribution of power between the 
institutions within this new procedure (Rasmussen 2012, 740). Empirical work has not provided clear 
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findings on the relative strength of the institutions. There are a number of policy cases that 
demonstrate the Parliament’s success in the co-decision procedure (Rasmussen 2012, 741.) A great 
example is the Working Time Directive for the road transport sector, 1998/0319/COD (The 
Commission 1999). In this case, the EP managed to broaden the scope of the directive, to not only 
cover drivers working for freight companies but also self-employed drivers, regardless of strong 
opposition coming on the behalf of a few member states (Rasmussen 2012, 741). To Corbett et al. 
(2007), this demonstrated the EP’s success under co-decision procedure, and made them explicitly 
comment that “there is little question that without co-decision it would have been impossible to 
overcome such opposition and to reach an agreement with the Council as a whole”. 
Quantitative research has not provided clear answers to the question of the relative strength of the 
institutions. In their empirical analysis, “Who wins,” König et al. (2007) show how in the conciliation 
processes the EP is the winner more often than the Council. However, the Council succeeded more 
often in disputes that involve multiple issue dimensions. (König et al. 2007.) Then again in Miller’s 
study that was conducted quickly after the conciliation had entered into force, it demonstrated that in 
46 percent of the first 26 cases, the text that came out from the conciliation committee was 
considerably closer to that of the Council’s common position. Only in 23 percent of cases was it 
closer to the position of the Parliament and in 31 percent, the text reflected clearly the joint position 
of the two institutions (Miller 1995). More recent studies, such as a study by Mariotto and Franchino 
(2011) of the 175 conciliation committee joint texts since Maastricht indicate that even if the co-
decision has diminished the advantage experienced by the Council, these texts are still closer to the 
prior positions of the Council than the Parliament. 
Costello and Thomson (2013, 1025) have also studied the distribution of power between the 
institutions. Their aim was to assess how the co-decision works in practice, by “using data on the 
preferences of legislative actors on a large number of proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2009”. 
The findings of their analysis suggested that the Parliament has gained power at the expense of the 
Commission and that the Parliament has indeed gained power in relation to the Council. However, 
the Council still enjoys more power since it has certain “bargaining advantages over the EP” and thus, 
the Parliament is not still in practice on equal footing with the Council. The Council has this 
“bargaining advantage” in situations where its position is closer to status quo than that of 
Parliament’s, which is very often the case. In addition, internal divisions within the Parliament are 
influencing its position in the bargaining negatively, whereas divisions within the Council are not 
weakening it. This, Costello and Thomson (2013, 1037) explain by the publicity of the Parliament’s 
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committee meetings and votes: if the divisions exist, the Council will know and this information can 
be used to their benefit.  
In the EU literature, the role of the Commission after the introduction of the co-decision procedure 
has not gained as much attention as the roles of the other two legislative institutions. In general, it is 
believed that the Commission is in the procedure in a weaker position in comparison to the others. 
Even though it sets out the proposal, both the EP and the Council can amend it, and at the end, the 
Council and the Parliament make the final decision without needing approval of the Commission. 
Interestingly, some scholars have even argued that the Commission does not possess any power at all 
(e.g. Crombez 1996; Tsebelis and Garrett 2000), yet others have claimed that the Commission may 
have an effect in regards to the outcome, however, mainly as the role of an informal mediator between 
the institutions (Rasmussen 2003, 2011). In this thesis, the basic assumption is closer to the latter one: 
it is assumed that even under the co-decision procedure, supranational institutions, including the 
Commission, may have a causal effect.  
According to Rasmussen, at first the scholars did not pay much attention to the internal workings 
within the institutions after the introduction of the co-decision procedure, but instead, treated them 
more as unitary actors (Rasmussen 2012, 742-743). Later studies have showed, however, that using 
the co-decision procedure has had implications not only to the relations between the institutions, but 
also within the institutions. Various studies have provided information on what concluding at 
different stages of the procedure had meant for the relative distribution of power among the actors 
inside the institutions. Since the Amsterdam Treaty enabled reconciling the deal at first reading, the 
visible trend has been broadening the use of this option to an increasing number of cases (Rasmussen 
2012, 743).  For example, the study by Toshkov and Rasmussen (2012) showed how from the 899 
co-decision cases that were handled in the fifth and sixth Parliaments, early agreements made between 
41 % and 57% of all co-decisions files agreed on between the years 2005 and July 2009. 
Scholars have studied, what changes these early agreements had brought along. Farrell and Héritier 
(2004) claim that the opportunity of reaching these “early agreements” has increased the power of 
certain actors within the institutions while weakening others. In practice, this has meant that actors 
with “formal negotiation authority” and actors within the legislative bodies that have networking 
skills, policy expertise and political support have benefitted. In the case of the Parliament, this has 
meant that bigger political groups and the rapporteurs have become more influential, whereas small 
political groups and the chairmen of the standing committees have lost power (Farrell and Héritier 
2004). However, in a more recent study, Rasmussen and Reh (2013) have shown how there is no 
intra-institutional power shift to the rapporteurs in the early agreements. 
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Scholars have also studied the power relations within the legislative bodies in the co-decision and 
other legislative procedures. Yordanova (2011) has shown that there is a systematic difference 
between co-decision and consultation when it comes to getting the rapporteurships. Interestingly, the 
author claims that in co-decisions, politicians from the center-right majority coalition and loyal party 
group members are preferred over others. The policy process studied here is not making any 
exception: both times the rapporteurs are coming from center-right parties. When it comes to the 
Council, Häge (2011) has found that different actors repeatedly take the decisions under co-decision 
and consultation. Even when the importance of the dossier is controlled, the decisions are more likely 
to be reached at ministerial level under co-decision than consultation. Häge (2011) explains this 
finding by increased politicization in the Council decision-making under co-decision. The increased 
politicization is why the bureaucrats let the issues be solved at the ministerial level.  
Serving as importance to my thesis, Burns and Carter (2010, 139) have asked if the co-decision has 
empowered the Parliament, and as the Parliament is known for being “an environmental champion”, 
has the co-decision been good for the environment? Their conclusion is that there is “no strong 
evidence that increases in the legislative power of this so-called environmental champion has resulted 
in a greener legislative output”. Their study showed that the introduction of the co-decision procedure 
has changed both the behavior of the Parliament, as well as the Council, and the Parliament has 
become more successful in getting its amendments adopted, at least in some form. Although 
additional amendments are adopted in quantitative terms, they are not necessarily “matched by 
environmental quality” (ibid).  
The literature on the effects of co-decision procedure is vast, and not everything can be covered in 
this part. What can be concluded is that the co-decision procedure has clearly affected both inter- and 
intra-institutional relations in numerous ways, some of which to be discovered. Even though there is 
still an ongoing discussion on whether the Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council in the 
procedure, there is a vast consensus that the Parliament is clearly much more influential than it was 
previously under other legislative procedures (see for example Rasmussen 2012, 747), and that the 
co-decision procedure has more or less weakened the Commission.  
The co-decision procedure consists of various steps. The Council and the Parliament can reach an 
agreement on the first, second or third readings (Rasmussen 2012, 737). In the case studied here, two 
readings were required before the legislative bodies reached an agreement. The procedure is 
explained in the article 294 in the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. The procedure can be summarized as follows (TFEU, article 294): 
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▪ The Commission submits a proposal to the European Parliament and the Council 
▪ The European Parliament adopts its position at first reading and informs it to the Council. 
▪ The Council has two choices: either it can approve the Parliament’s position or reject it.  
a. In case the Council approves the Parliament’s position, the act is adopted in the 
wording of the position of the Parliament.  
b. In case the Council decides to reject, it must adopt its position at first reading and 
inform the Parliament. The Council needs to comprehensively inform the Parliament 
of the reasons which led it to adopt its own position at first reading. The Commission 
needs to clearly communicate the Council’s position to the Parliament.  
 
▪ The Parliament has three choices: it can approve, reject or propose amendments.  
a. In case the Parliament approves the Council’s position at first reading or does not take 
a decision, the act is adopted in the wording of the position of the Council. 
b. In case the Parliament rejects the Council’s position at first reading, the proposed act 
is not adopted. To reject, the Parliament needs the majority of its component members.  
c. In case the Parliament proposes amendments to the Council’s position at first reading, 
the amended text needs to be forwarded both the Council and the Commission, which 
need to give their opinion on the amendments. Again, the Parliament needs the 
majority of its component members to propose amendments.  
▪ The Council needs to act within three months of receiving the Parliament’s amendments. It 
needs to reach a qualified majority and either approve or reject the amendments. 
a. In case the Council approves all the amendments, the act is adopted. 
b. In case the Council rejects the amendments, the President of the Council in the 
agreement with the President of the European Parliament, need to summon a meeting 
of the Conciliation Committee within six weeks.   
▪ The Council’s action on the amendments on which the Commission has conveyed a negative 
opinion needs to be unanimous.  
The Conciliation Committee that is convened at this point operates under certain rules.  
▪ The Committee consists of either the members of the Council themselves or their 
representatives. The same number of members need to represent the Parliament. The 
representatives have a task to reach an agreement on a joint text. The representatives of 
the Council need to agree by a qualified majority of the members whereas the 
representatives of the Parliament need the majority of the members. The agreement 
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needs to happen within six weeks after the Committee has summoned together. The 



























3.1 Theories of the decision-making in the EU 
 
In sum, the focus of this study is the policy process that led to the creation of the GMO Directive. 
More precisely, the interest lies in the role that the EU institutions played in the process. Therefore, 
the choices made regarding the theoretical framework are reflecting this interest.  On the course of 
European integration, scholars have created a great variety of approaches for studying decision-
making in the European Union.  
The best suited one for the purpose of this study is new institutionalism, which enables one to regard 
institutions as significant political actors of their own right, instead of treating them as impartial 
“black boxes”, or mediators, which turn the interests of others into political outcomes. Nevertheless, 
one should not make a mistake of overestimating the role of institutions through assuming that they 
have a stronger impact on the process than they in fact have. The term "new institutionalism" is used 
here as an umbrella term, covering different approaches which emphasize the role of institutions. 
However, approaches differ widely when it comes to the definition of “institutions” and how in fact 
institutions matter. The specific approach applied in the research is explained in detail at a later stage. 
However, firstly, I will provide a short overview of other theories related to EU decision-making.  
In this section, a short overview is made to the approaches used in the past to study decision-making 
in the European Union. At first, it was thought that the most pressing questions about the EU could 
be answered with integration theories, even the ones concerning decision-making. Already back then, 
theorists of European integration of the school of neo-functionalism believed that the EU institutions 
have interests, which they sought to pursue in actual decision-making situations. Neofunctionalists 
argued that supranational institutions were having a significant causal role in European integration 
(see for example Haas 1958, Lindberg 1963) whereas intergovernmentalists (see for example 
Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1999) generally denied any significant causal effect for them. These two 
schools of thought have not only been the most influential attempts to theorize the development in 
Europe during the last century, the process called European integration, but also the first theories 
dealing with decision-making in the European Union.  
Neofunctionalists explained integration as a spillover process. At first, two or more countries agree 
to work for integration in a certain sector, such as coal and steel. In order to accomplish this task more 
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efficiently, they agree to appoint a supranational bureaucracy - a ‘’high authority’ to use the parlance 
of the time - to oversee operations. While the integration of a sector achieves some of the supposed 
benefits, the full advantage of integration will not be achieved unless related economic sectors are 
also drawing into the integrative web. Neo-functionalist predicted that over time, sectoral integration 
would produce the unintended and unforeseen consequence of promoting further integration in 
additional issue areas (see Haas 1961 and Lindberg 1963). 
While it is clear that co-operation in one policy area leads into pressure to co-operate in additional 
issue areas, the history has shown examples of situations in which the member states have powerfully 
shown the limits of the policy areas in which they want to co-operate. For instance, in the field of 
energy policy, which is closely linked with economic activity and environmental issues, two highly 
Europeanized policy fields are fairly non-Europeanized regardless of the pressures. Energy policy 
issues touch strongly upon issues such as national security and have avoided the strong inferences 
from the side of the European Union. However, the field of environmental policy has been fairly 
Europeanized, surprisingly to many. 
Neofunctionalism was the first influential attempt to explain European integration.  A response to 
criticism of neofunctionalism came in the form of intergovernmentalism. Intergovernmentalists  
believe that the nation-states have a greater role in the process of integration in comparison to the 
perspective of neofunctionalists. The approach is drawing on realism which is the school of 
international relations that stresses that nation-states are the most important actors in international 
politics. For neo-realists, EU decision-making is ‘the practice of ordinary diplomacy’ although ‘under 
conditions creating unusual opportunities for providing collective goods through highly 
institutionalized exchange’ (Pierson 1996, 124). Thus, the European Union is only as powerful as its 
Member States wish it to be (Peterson & Bomberg 1999, 7). As seen in energy and environmental 
policy fields, regardless of the pressure from the European Union side and the ‘spill-over’ effect, the 
member states of the European Union have been able to choose if they wish to enhance co-operation 
or not.  
The main claim of intergovernmentalists is that pace and nature of integration are ultimately 
determined by national governments pursuing national interest; and the nations have the political 
legitimacy that comes from being democratically elected. Like Stanley Hoffman (1966) has stated: 
the nation-state far from being ‘obsolete,’ had proven ‘obstinate’. Andrew Moravcsik built upon the 
ideas of Hoffman, accepting many of the key ideas of intergovernmentalism, however, he took the 
analysis further in his liberal intergovernmentalist approach. He offers a model of a two-level game 
to explain European integration, consisting both of a liberal theory of national preference formation 
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and an intergovernmentalist account of strategic bargaining between states (see for example 
Moravcsik 1999).  
The reality proved  the claims of neofunctionalists wrong. The Empty Chair Crisis in 1960s showed 
that the power of the member states and the integration did not go further as neofunctionalists had 
predicted. As put by Rosamond (2000, 50), “there may not be many ‘fundamentalist’ 
neofunctionalists around” but there are many who use features of the neofunctionalist thinking. As in 
this thesis, some features of the neofunctionalist thinking are present. The causal role of the 
supranational institutions in the decision-making is accepted, yet within the limits set by the member 
states, and it is also accepted that the supranational institutions may have their own preferences. 
However, such features of the neofunctionalist thinking, as shift of loyalty from the national level to 
the supranational level, is nowadays completely disregarded.  
Although the principal-agent model in the study of the European Union is drawing from economics 
and is not originally developed within the realm of political science, features of both 
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are present to some extent. While it is acknowledged 
that the power rests in the hands of the member states (since member states have the control 
mechanisms to control the agency of supranational institutions), the assumption also is that 
supranational institutions are having preferences distinct from those of their principals that they may 
pursue in actual decision-making situations.  
Traditional theories of integration have provided interesting insights from which some have proved 
to be more accurate than others. However, as Elizabeth Bomberg and John Peterson (1999, 6-9) have 
pointed out, these approaches are good theoretical tools in the area of the “big” decisions and history-
making of the EU, whereas they do not suit the analysis of the EU’s inner processes. The shift in the 
academic focus from explaining the integration process to understanding the European Union as a 
political system happened in the 1990s. The new way of thinking can be traced back to the statement 
of Simon Hix, when he called for scholars of the discipline to study the EU with their established 
concepts before solely studying public policy and international relations (Hix 1994).  
One of the new approaches to study decision-making in the European Union is a policy network 
analysis. The strength of the approach is that it acknowledges the influence of various actors and by 
doing so, it probably provides a fairly realistic, nuanced picture of the decision-making process in 
one particular policy sub-field. The term ‘policy network’ connotes “a cluster of actors, each of which 
has an interest, or ‘stake’ in a given… policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success 
failure” (Peterson & Bomberg 1999, 8).  As Peterson puts it, “analysts of modern governance 
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frequently seek to explain policy outcomes by investigating how networks, which facilitate 
bargaining between stakeholders over policy design and detail, are structured in a particular sector” 
(Peterson 2009, 105). Unlike the principal-agent approach applied in this study, the policy network 
analysis studies a larger cluster of actors. By doing that it gives a more holistic picture of how a 
certain outcome is reached, taking account the influence of other actors, rather than solely EU 
institutions.  
However, the policy networks analysis has never been short of critics. It has been criticized based on 
three main things. First, critics have argued that ‘policy network’ may be a useful metaphor, but it 
does not constitute a model or theory. Secondly, policy network analysis lacks a theory of power. 
Thirdly and finally, the literature on policy networks is often vague and caught up with insular, and 
purely academic debates about terminology. Overall, policy network analysis is still not a “leading 
theoretical approach” in the same league as institutionalism, intergovernmentalism and 
constructivism (Cowles and Curtis 2004, 305). In contrast to policy network analysis, the principal-
agent model provides a clear model, embedded in theory that may not take account of all the actors 
in the decision-making process but consider the influence of the most important ones.  Taken the 
empirical evidence, an expectation that the institutions have certain preferences is justifiable. 
In addition to these theories of decision-making presented here, one analytical concept which has 
gained popularity during recent years has been ‘multi-level governance’ which refers to a system in 
which power is shared among the supranational, national, sub-national and local levels, with 
considerable interaction among them (see Hooghe and Marks 2001). The approach has been used to 
study the EU environmental policy, for instance the climate and energy package of 2009 (see for 
example Boasson and Wettedstad 2013). The approach catches quite well the nature of the EU 
decision-making, in which different political levels are highly interlinked. As this policy question 
reveals the importance and interconnections of different policy levels, this approach could be a good 
analytical tool to understand the GMO policy of the EU. However, as it does not place enough 
emphasis on the EU institutions and the interaction between them, this analytical tool was ruled out. 
Next, it is time to make an overview of the chosen theoretical framework, namely new 
institutionalism, in which the focus is put on the institutions and the role they play in the decision-
making process. Following this, a further exploration will be made of the one variant of the new 





3.2. New Institutionalism 
 
In the thesis, the principal-agent model provides the analytical lens for analysis. While the GMO 
directive enables the researcher to ask a myriad of different questions regarding such issues as 
politicization of science, the international obligations of the EU and interplay between the various 
levels from the grassroot level all the way up to the international level, this thesis provides an 
innovative way to look into this complex policy process, making sense of it by using the principal-
agent model. The intriguing question is, how much explanatory power does this kind of rather simple, 
parsimonious model possess?  
This section is mainly based on the much cited article by Hall and Taylor (1996), Political Science 
and three new institutionalisms. As mentioned earlier, new institutionalism is a theoretical approach 
in political science which emphasizes the role of institutions. However, given the diverse disciplinary 
starting points, it is perhaps disingenuous to talk about new institutionalism as a movement 
(Rosamond 2000). Instead, it consists of at least three different theoretical approaches, each of which 
calling itself ‘a new institutionalism’ (Hall & Taylor 1996). Some have even distinguished between 
seven different varieties of new institutionalism (Peters 2007), while others, such as Armstrong and 
Bulmer have solely distinguished between historical and rational choice variants (Armstrong & 
Bulmer 1998). In this thesis, I am only presenting historical, sociological and rational-choice 
institutionalism.  
These three forms of institutionalism developed in reaction to the behavioral perspectives that were 
influential during the 1960s and 1970s (Hall & Taylor 1996) but also during the growing ascendancy 
of rational choice theory in subsequent decades (Hay 2002, 10).  An another reason for the growing 
interest in new institutionalism, or the impetus for it, was the concern that political scientists had 
neglected for a quite some time how important the state is as a shaper of outcomes (Evans et al. 1985).  
Today, it is conventional to see political science characterized by these three distinctive perspectives 
– rational choice theory, behaviouralism and new institutionalism. New institutionalism differs from 
these first two in two key respects. Firstly, it questions the assumed regularity in human behavior on 
which rests behaviouralisms’ reliance on a logic of extrapolation and generalization (or induction). 
Instead, new institutionalism suggests more complex and plausible assumptions. Secondly, it 
abandons the simplifying assumption which makes the rational choice theory’s modelling of political 
behavior possible (Hay 2002). 
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The main idea behind the rational choice theory is that political actors are instrumental, self-serving, 
and utility-maximizers. Theory is drawing from neo-classical economics and trying to import the 
rigor and predictive power of neo-classical economics into political science. It seeks to construct 
stylized (and often mathematical) models of political conduct by assuming that individuals are 
rational and behave as if they engage in a cost-benefit analysis of each and every choice available to 
them before choosing the option which is most likely to maximize their material self-interest. The 
purpose of the theory is to produce a deductive science of the political on the basis of a series of 
simplifying assumptions (Hay 2002, 7-10.) 
Unlike the approach I am applying, the interest lies in preferences and actions of individual actors 
instead of institutions.  For instance, the classical example is the so-called 'tragedy of commons,' 
identified by Garrett Hardin (1968) which focuses on the individual actors that act in their own self-
interest and exploit the natural resources that eventually leads to environmental degradation. Even 
though it would be for the common good to handle the resources wisely, the actors are not willing to 
limit their own actions if they are not sure that others will too. In situations like this, individual 
rationality can translate into collective irrationality. 
Like rational choice theory, behaviouralism also aims to predict political behavior. However, it bases 
predictions on extrapolation and generalization from observed empirical regularities instead of on the 
deduction of testable hypotheses from simplifying assumptions about human nature. Behaviouralism 
aims at developing an inductive approach to political science, allowing it to generate predictive 
hypotheses on the basis of the quantitative analysis of human behavior at an aggregate level (Hay 
2002, 10). 
New institutionalism has four key assumptions. The first is that 'institutions matter' and political 
conduct is shaped profoundly by the institutional context in which it occurs and acquires significance. 
Secondly, 'history matters' and the legacy that the past bequeaths to the present is considerable. 
Thirdly, political systems are complex and inherently unpredictable. Fourthly, actors do not always 
behave instrumentally in a pursuit of material self-interest (Hay 2002, 14). 
Armstrong and Bulmer argue that the NI approach offers powerful diagnostic tools for understanding 
systemic level EU decision-making (Armstrong & Bulmer 1998). Further, new institutionalist 
analysis of the EU reveals that the Union’s common institutions are often more than mere arbiters in 
the decision-making process but being instead key players in their own right (Bomberg & Peterson 
1999). As Rosamond puts it, new institutionalism gives us a whole new way to look into the decision-
making in the European Union (Rosamond 2000, 115). 
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As pointed out earlier, different approaches in new institutionalism developed in parallel, in addition 
to historical institutionalism. Unlike in other approaches, the roots of historical institutionalism are 
in group theories of politics and structural-functionalism. These approaches from which historical 
institutionalism is drawing from were prominent approaches in political science during the 1960s and 
1970s. More precisely, historical institutionalism developed in response to these two, borrowing from 
both but aspiring to go beyond them (Hall & Taylor 1996, 937).   
All the different institutionalist approaches define institutions in different ways. Historical 
institutionalists define them as the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy. These can range from the 
rules of a constitutional order of the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the 
conventions governing trade union behavior and bank-firm relations (Hall & Taylor 1996, 938). 
When compared to the other two approaches, historical institutionalism differs in four key respects. 
Firstly, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and 
individual behavior in relatively broad terms. Secondly, they emphasize the asymmetries of power 
associated with the operation and development of institutions. Thirdly, they tend to have a view of 
institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Fourthly, 
they are especially concerned with integrating institutional analysis with the contribution that other 
kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes. In general, historical institutionalists 
associate institutions with organizations and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal 
organization (Hall & Taylor 1996, 938). 
Historical institutionalists believed that the institutional organization of the polity or political 
economy as the principal actor in structuring collective behavior and generating distinctive outcomes. 
Historical institutionalists started to look more closely at the state, which was seen “no longer as a 
neutral broker among competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the 
character and outcomes of group conflict” (Hall & Taylor 1996, 937-938). Not long after these early 
analyses, scholars of this school of thought begin to study how other social and political institutions, 
especially those linked with labor and capital, “could structure interactions so as to generate 
distinctive national trajectories” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).  
Historical institutionalism has been used as an approach in explaining environmental policy-making 
in the European Union. In the book, “EU Climate Policy,” Boasson and Wettestad (2013) use both 
approaches - sociological and historical institutionalism to explain the decision-making processes 
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related to the climate and energy package of 2008. Whereas Burns (2012) used the historical 
institutionalist analysis to explain EU’s biotechnology policy. 
Sociological institutionalism arose primarily within the subfield of organization theory. New 
institutionalists in sociology began to argue that many of the institutional forms and procedures used 
by modern organizations were not adopted simply because they were most efficient for the tasks at 
hand, in line with some transcendent ‘rationality.’ Instead, they argue that many of these forms and 
procedures used by modern organizations should be seen as culturally-specific practices (Hall & 
Taylor 1996). 
What are the characteristics of sociological institutionalism? First of all, in this approach, the term 
“institution” is defined more broadly than political scientists normally do, including not just formal 
rules, procedures or norms, but also the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates. 
Second of all, new institutionalists in sociology have a distinctive understanding of the relationship 
between institutions and individual action, which follow the ‘cultural approach’ (yet displaying some 
characteristic nuances). In the older line of sociological analysis, individuals who have been 
socialized into particular institutional roles internalize the norms associated with these roles. Further, 
many sociological institutionalists emphasize the highly-interactive and mutually-constitutive 
character of the relationship between institutions and individual action.  
Thirdly and finally, the new institutionalists in sociology also take a distinctive approach to the 
problem of explaining how institutional practices originate and change. Many rational choice 
institutionalists explain the development of an institution by reference to the efficiency with which it 
serves the material ends of those who accept it. On the contrary, sociological institutionalists argue 
that organizations often adopt a new institutional practice, not because it advances the means - ends 
efficiency of the organization, but because it enhances the social legitimacy of the organization or its 
participants. In other words, organizations embrace specific institutional forms or practices because 
the latter are widely valued within a broader cultural environment (Hall & Taylor 1996). 
Originally, rational choice institutionalism arose from the study of American congressional behavior. 
To a large extent, it was inspired by the observation of a significant paradox - if conventional rational 
choice postulates are correct, it should be difficult to secure stable majorities for legislation in the US 
Congress where the multiple preference-orderings of legislators and multidimensional character of 
issues should lead to rapid ‘cycling’ from one bill to another as new majorities appear to overturn any 
bill that is passed. Yet congressional outcomes actually show considerable stability (Hall & Taylor 
1996, 942-943).  
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According to Pollack, the current rational-choice literature on American political institutions can be 
traced to Kenneth Shepsle’s pioneering work in which he has shed some light to the institutions 
influence in the US Congress. Starting with the observation, made by Richard McKelvey (1976) and 
Willian Riker (1980) among others, that in a majoritarian decision-making system policy choices are 
innately unstable ‘cycling’ among multiple possible equilibria, Shepsle  argued in his study that 
Congressional institutions, and in particular the committee system, could produce ‘structure-induced 
equilibrium’ by ruling some alternative as permissible or impermissible and by structuring the voting 
and veto powers of various actors in the decision-making process. More recently, Shepsle and others 
have increasingly started to focus on the problem of ‘equilibrium institutions’, specifically, “how 
actors choose or design institutions to secure mutual gains, and how those institutions change or 
persist over time”. (Pollack 2003, 5.) 
According to Pollack, the innovation of Shepsle and the subsequent development of the rational-
choice approach to Congressional institutions have produced a number of theoretical offshoots with 
potential applications in comparative as well as international politics. Although all these approaches 
were originally formulated and applied in the context of American political institutions, Pollack 
argues that these approaches are applicable in these other contexts. (Pollack 2003.) Naturally, this is 
also one of the assumptions behind this study as well, since the principal-agent model, applied by 
Pollack is being used as a main guiding model in this thesis and that model is drawing from these 
approaches used originally to study Congressional institutions.   
Shepsle’s innovation and the subsequent development of the rational-choice approach to 
Congressional institutions have produced a number of theoretical offshoots with potential 
applications in comparative as well as international politics. For example, Shepsle and others have 
examined in some detail the ‘agenda-setting’ power of the induced equilibrium, specifying the 
conditions under which agenda-setting committees could influence the outcomes of certain 
Congressional votes. Shepsle’s ‘distributive’ model of Congressional committees has, however, been 
challenged by Keith Krehbiel and others scholars, who agree that committees possess agenda-power 
but argue that the committee system serves an ‘informational’ rather than distributive function by 
providing members with an incentive to acquire and share policy-relevant information with other 
members of Congress (Pollack 2003). 
In another offshoot, students of the Congress have developed principal-agent models of 
Congressional delegation of authority to regulatory bureaucracies - and later to courts - and the efforts 
of Congress to control those bureaucracies. More recently, Epstein and O’Halloran (1994; 1999), b) 
and others have pioneered a ’transaction cost approach’ to the design of political institutions, arguing 
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that legislators deliberately and systematically design political institutions to minimize the transaction 
costs associated with making public policy (Pollack 2003). Next, we will take a closer look at the 
model.  
 
3.3 Mark A.Pollack’s principal-agent analysis 
 
Principal-agent model was initially developed within the study of economics. In the 1970s, scholars 
within the new organizational economics created it in order to understand the contractual relationship 
“between two (or more) parties when one of these, designated by the agents, acts on behalf of or as a 
representative for the other, the principal” (Ross 1973, 134-139). It did not take long for political 
scientists to realize the usefulness of the approach to the study of politics. Throughout the last 30 
years, the approach has been applied to various political science topics, like oversight function of the 
US Congress (Weingast & Moran 1983), national security (Downs & Rocke 1994) and the UN 
Secretary General (Johnstone 2003). The model has gained popularity during the years, and today it 
is in fact one of the prominent approaches to the study of delegation in American, comparative and 
international politics (Pollack 2007, 2). The EU scholars have also realized the usefulness of the 
approach to the study of the EU. Scholars have applied the model to study certain EU institutions or 
the relations between them, such as the EU Council Presidency (Tallberg 2003), the Parliament and 
the Court of Justice (Pollack 2003) and the relations between the European Council and the 
Commission (Bocquillon & Dobbels 2014), and to substantive areas of EU policy – for example the 
EU as a negotiator in the international environment negotiations (Delreux 2009) and risk regulation 
as relates to BSE crisis in the 1990’s (Krapohl 2003). 
This thesis is based on the work of Mark A. Pollack. Put simply, as in other principal-agent settings, 
the member governments of the EU decide to delegate power and discretion to the European 
Commission and the Court of Justice to increase efficiency, or to put more precisely, “decrease 
transaction costs” of EU decision-making. However, the delegation of power to the supranational 
level increases the risks that these “agents” seek to act upon their own preferences that are distinct 
from those of their principals. As the literature on the EU has shown, it has seemed that these 
supranational institutions are having preference for further integration and maximizing their own 
competence. Principals design and tailor a wide range of control mechanisms to limit this “agency 
discretion” and maximize the benefits of delegation across issue areas and over time (Pollack 2003, 
19). Regardless of their general and common preference for greater integration, the preferences of 
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these supranational institutions are not identical. Their preferences reflect their differences in their 
institutional positions vis-à-vis the member governments and each other (Pollack 2003, 385). 
Principal-agent models of delegation are built upon an assumption that agents have preferences 
distinct from those of their legislative principals, and if let free to ‘shirk,’ they will act on those 
preferences which in fact means that legislative outcomes move away from the original intent of the 
principals who created them. To illustrate it better, Pollack gives an example of the employer-
employee relationship, in which this kind of “shirking” happens. In the employer-employee 
relationship, the employee as an agent is often presumed to want to maximize her income while 
minimizing the effort she puts into her job. In this situation, “shirking’ is essentially synonymous 
with a lack of productivity among workers and can be controlled by using monitoring and sanctioning 
behavior or by using incentives to encourage workers to remain productive even when their behavior 
is not monitored. However, in the political relationship between a group of legislators and their agent, 
the problem is not the agents’ aversion to work but instead drifting from the principals’ collective 
preferences (Pollack 2003, 35). 
The interesting question is why supranational organizations exhibit pro-integrationist or competence-
maximizing preferences. For instance, one possible reason is socialization of new employees as they 
arrive within the Commission (cf. Mancini 1991) or simply bureaucratic politics (Peters 1992). 
Whatever reason behind these preferences, many scholars from competing theories have assumed 
that the Commission, Court and European Parliament have all pursued a broadly integrationist agenda 
throughout the history of the European Union (Pollack 2003, 36).  In sum, the starting point of the 
analysis is as in Pollack’s study that the EU supranational agents act as unitary, rational, competence-
maximizers and I am not elaborating much further the reasons behind the preferences possessed by 
them. Scholars have also given reasons for the EP’s preference for pro-environmental preferences, 
including the amount of green MEPS in the Environment Committee (Weale et al. 2000), but I will 
not elaborate further the reasons behind this preference in this study. All in all, for one reason or 
another, scholars have identified these institutions to possess these preferences and I am interested to 
find out whether these preferences of institutions and their way to act upon them is affecting decision-
making. 
However, the policy preferences institutions are having are not always competence-maximizing. For 
instance, in the case of US, the Environmental Protection Agency is typically considered to possess 
relatively ‘green’ preferences for a high level of environmental protection, and that it is trying to 
maximize these green preferences in policy terms within the limits set by a President and Congress 
whose commitment to environmental protection may fluctuate considerably over time (Pollack 2003, 
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35; Wood 1988). On the EU level, European Parliament has been claimed to have pro-environmental 
policy preferences. Different sources have claimed that it has both seen itself and also has been seen 
by others as the defender of environmental interests (Weale et al. 2000, 91). Burns et al. (2013) have 
also conducted an empirical study to test if this claim holds after the introduction of co-legislation 
procedure.  Before it was claimed that also the Commission, and especially the DG ENV inside it, 
was “full of ecological freaks,” yet during the years, the DG ENV has become more “mainstreamed” 
(Weale et al. 2000). 
Now we have decided to assume that supranational agents do indeed have a preference for ‘more 
Europe’ as Ross has summarized the competence maximizer preferences of the Commission and other 
supranational institutions. The next question is, under what conditions are those agents likely to act 
on those preferences rather than implementing strictly and faithfully the preferences of the member 
states that created and empowered them? As pointed out earlier, principals have created different 
kinds of mechanisms to control their agents. More precisely, usually administrative procedures are 
being set out - delegating authority to an agent, identifying the scope of delegation, the instruments 
available to the agent – regulation, economic incentives, direct provision of public goods, and so forth 
– and the procedures that the agent is required to follow in carrying out its delegated functions 
(Pollack 2003, 30). If all else is equal, the autonomy of an agent should be greatest when the scope 
of delegation is wide, the choice of instruments is broad, and the procedural requirements are 
minimal. On the contrary, the ability of a principal or principals to control agency behavior should be 
greatest where the scope of delegation and the range of available instruments is narrow and where the 
procedural requirements governing agency action are most detailed and constraining (Pollack 2003, 
39-41).   
“The principal agent turn” has made scholars reflect upon the flaws and merits of the model.  Various 
EU scholars have justly questioned the image of the Commission and other supranational agents as 
unitary rational actors with a one-dimensional set of preferences defined in terms of more or less 
integration. For example, as Cram (1994) puts it, the literature of the Commission frequently begins 
by noting that the organization is in fact a ‘multi-organization,’ divided into a ‘political’ level 
composed of the Commissioners and their cabinets and ‘administrative’ level composed of an ever-
changing number of Directorate-Generals (DGS), each of which having its own mission and 
organizational culture (Pollack 2003). Similar observations apply to the European Parliament, where 
partisan differences among members are central to the organization and shape its procedures (Pollack 
2003). This is also being pointed out when referring to the European Parliament as a ‘pro-
environmental actor’ – in fact, much of the reputation is largely due to the work of the Environment 
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Committee, which is also the committee having one of the heaviest workloads of any other Parliament 
committee (Weale et al. 2000, 92).  
Kassim and Menon have also criticized the model for treating supranational institutions as unitary 
actors out in their critical overview of the principal-agent model and the deployment of the model by 
authors writing from four theoretical approaches. The first problem for them is the extent of which 
these approaches simplify the complexity of the EU. They argue that assuming either supranational 
institutions or member states being unitary actors is “extremely questionable” (Kassim & Menon 
2003, 133). They continue that even though the level of analysis that is chosen by the authors whose 
work they assess might make the assumption appealing, still, “even as a convenient fiction it is 
problematic” (Kassim & Menon 2003, 133). 
In a more recent contribution to this debate, Billiet, Hodson and Maher conclude that “the overarching 
finding of this symposium is that the principal-agent approach is highly salient for EU scholars, but 
that it must be handled with care” (Billiet, Hodson & Maher 2009, 412). While the writers agree that 
the model has a number of benefits, it also suffers from a few severe methodological limitations. In 
their opinion, the legal dimension of relationships between principals and agents is commonly “under-
articulated” in studies of EU policy-making. Another concern for them is “the lack of criteria for 
choosing one specification of a principal-agent relationship over other conceivable alternatives – and 
the difficulties of identifying a specific explanation for agency slack in the presence of many possible 
explanations” (ibid.). 
As Pollack puts it, it is unquestionably correct that the Commission is composed of hundreds of 
bureaucratic sub-units and individuals, each of which often has distinct policy preferences; and that 
the internal Commission politics is frequently depicted as a haven of bureaucratic politics and intra-
organizational struggle. Nevertheless, the idea is whether these organizations behave with sufficient 
coherence vis-à-vis member governments and other organizations so that we can, for the purpose of 
analysis, treat them as unitary actors (Pollack 2003, 36). As Tsebelis and others have argued, in so 
far the Commission and Parliament “typically vote by simple majority with no restrictive rules for 
amendments, each agent can be represented simply in terms of the preferences of the median voter in 
each organization” (Pollack 2003, 37). In short, as Pollack argues in his book, for our purpose the 
question to be asked is not whether these supranational institutions are monolithic blocks with 
uniform preferences, but instead, whether they are generally behaving coherently and predictably 
according to a set of shared organizational preferences (Pollack 2003, 37). After this short overview 
to the relevant theories, approaches and relevant information on the decision-making in the EU, it is 





The hypotheses in this thesis are based on the EU literature, part of which is presented above. As 
already pointed out, the literature has provided convincing proof that the supranational institutions of 
the EU, including the Commission and the Parliament, have demonstrated pro-integration and 
competence-maximizing preferences and acted upon those preferences in various situations. Also, the 
Parliament’s pro-environmental credentials have become well-known. Even though these preferences 
have shown some signs of fainting slightly from how strong they were – for instance the Parliament 
has started to promote slightly less pro-environmental proposals – there is still a clear rational for 
making these hypotheses. Expecting the leader-laggard dimension to explain the dynamics within the 
Environment Council has also become a pretty well-established assumption. The theoretical 
framework presented above is on what I base the following hypotheses:  
"The Commission and the Parliament both have pro-integrationist and competence-maximizing 
preferences during the decision-making process of the GMO directive." 
"The Parliament has pro-environmental preferences during the decision-making process of the GMO 
directive.” 















4.1 Case study research 
 
The case study has different meanings for different people and in different disciplines. However, there 
are some characteristics that all these approaches have in common. In broad terms, a case study can 
be defined as “a process of conducting systematic, critical inquiry into a phenomenon of choice and 
generating understanding to contribute to cumulative public knowledge of the topic” (Simons 2009).  
Robert E. Stake defines case study as “the study of particularity and complexity of a single case, 
coming to understand its activity within important circumstances” (Stake 1995), whereas Yin (2003, 
13) defines it as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident”. The purpose of the case study, regardless of the field of study, is to catch the complexity of 
a single case and that the study should be done in a systematic manner.  
The case study is not a research method. It is referred to as a method, a strategy, or an approach, and 
not always consistently (Simons 2011). Simons prefers a word “approach” to indicate that a case 
study has an overarching research intent and methodological (and political) purpose which affects 
what methods are chosen to gather data (Simons 2011). In this thesis, case study research is also 
referred to as an approach.  
Case study research has a long history and started in disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, 
history and psychology and the professions of law and medicine. All these disciplines have developed 
their own procedures to ensure the validity of case studies for their respective purposes. However, 
the methods that are used in these disciplines differ. Open-ended interviews, participant observation 
and document analysis are some methods in use and the focus is on studying a single case in depth 
interpreted in a specific socio/cultural/political setting (Simons 2011).  
As previously mentioned, all case studies are not the same. One distinction can be made between 
intrinsic case studies and instrumental case studies. When an intrinsic case is in question, we are 
interested in a case, not because by studying it we learn about other cases or about some general 
problem, but because we need to learn about that particular case. In other words, we have an intrinsic 
interest in the case. Whereas in an instrumental case study, we will have a research question, a 
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puzzlement or a need for general understanding and we feel that we may get insight into the question 
by studying a particular case (Stake 1995, 3). 
While all case studies share some characteristics, differences exist between disciplines. George and 
Bennett (2005) have written the book, “Case studies and theory development in the social sciences,” 
in which they provide a great outlook into how case studies are done in the field of political science. 
In political science, there are three phases in the design and implementation of theory-oriented case 
studies. In the first phase, design and structure of the research are set. In phase two, the case study is 
being carried out in accordance with the design; and finally in phase three, the researcher draws upon 
the findings of the case study and assesses their contribution in achieving the research objective of 
the study (George and Bennett 2005). 
The problem of the study should be based on the research literature. As George and Bennett put it, 
the problem should “be embedded in a well-informed assessment that identifies gaps in the current 
state of knowledge, acknowledges contradictory theories, and notes inadequacies in the evidence for 
existing theories" (George and Bennett 2005, 74). The literature on case studies often emphasizes that 
the linkage between the empirical case and existing theories must be even stronger than in the context 
of comparative or quantitative research.  
Phase one includes five tasks. These tasks are relevant not solely for case study methodology but 
instead for all types of systematic, theory-oriented research. These tasks must be adapted to different 
types of investigations but also to whether theory testing or theory development is the focus of the 
study. The design phase of theory-oriented case study research is of particular critical importance. If 
a research design proves inadequate, it will be difficult to achieve the research objectives of the study. 
Yet naturally, the quality of the study depends also on how well the other two phases are conducted 
(George & Bennett 2005, 73-74). 
The research objective is the most important decision in designing the research. This is because it 
constrains and guides decisions that will be made regarding the other four tasks. A clear, well-
reasoned statement of the research problem is helpful because it generates and focuses the 
investigation (George & Bennett 2005, 74). Studying environmental decision-making in the European 
Union is a large topic. Therefore, making choices early on concerning the research objective is crucial.   
It is important to be explicit in what will not be studied and what phenomenon or behavior will be 
singled out for examination. In other words, what is the class or subclass of events of which the cases 
will be instances (George & Bennett 2005). In this study, the focus is on the EU institutions. In reality, 
there are a number of other actors contributing to the policy process such as companies and 
47 
 
environmental organizations. However, in this thesis, the decision is made that the impact of these 
other actors is not being assessed in detail.  
There are important questions that need to be asked when creating the theoretical framework for the 
study. Bennett and George advise to ask - what theoretical framework will be employed, and if there 
are an existing theory or rival candidate theories that bear on those aspects of the phenomenon or 
behavior that are to be explained. Further, they advise asking which aspects of the existing theory or 
theories will be singled out for testing, refinement or elaboration (George and Bennett 2005). 
The preferences of the actors are studied by analyzing the documents available in the Eurlex database, 
accompanied with journalistic material available online. The focus of this study is to gain an 
understanding of what the actors are suggesting in the course of the policy process and how the actors 
are reacting to others’ suggestions. The latter is especially important in regards to the preferences of 
the Commission: the Parliament and the Council are the institutions that decide on the issue jointly, 
while the Commission’s role is a more passive one.  
On the side of the Commission, the preferences are analyzed posing the following questions: What is 
the Commission suggesting in its initial proposal for the Directive? Is the Commission making 
suggestions that are reflecting pro-integration and competence-maximizing preferences? Later, when 
the other institutions have set out their own proposals: how is the Commission reacting to those? Is 
the Commission ready to broaden the grounds on which the GMO ban can be based as suggested by 
the Parliament? How is the Commission reacting to the suggestions by the Council? Is the 
Commission trying to use possible windows of opportunities to promote its preferences?  
 
4.2 Introduction to the material 
 
In this section, “a case” is referred to as the legislative process that led to the changes of the directive 
2001/18/EC, allowing member states to ban the cultivation of GMOs in their territory. The primary 
material of the thesis consists of the official documents written during the process. The documents 
can be accessed either through the Eurlex database or the European Parliament’s website.   
These include documents such as the proposal for the Directive, discussions within the relevant 
institutions, an indicative list of grounds on which the ban can be justified, the Parliament’s and 
Council’s position at first and second readings, and the final version.  Firstly, on the part of the 
Commission, a total of 5 documents are used, including the proposal for the directive, an indicative 
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list of grounds on which the ban can be justified, the Commission’s position on EP amendments at 
first reading, the adoption by the Commission of its communication on the Council’s position on first 
reading and adoption by the Commission of opinion on EP amendments on the second reading. 
Secondly, on the part of the Council, a total of 7 documents are used, including a discussion within 
the Council or its preparatory bodies in 2010, a discussion within the Council or its preparatory bodies 
in 2011, the Council’s agreement in 2012, a discussion within the Council’s preparatory bodies in 
2014, the Council’s agreement in 2014, the adoption of the Council’s position at first reading in 2014, 
and the approval by the Council of the EP amendments at the second reading. Thirdly, on the part of 
the Parliament, a total of 3 documents are used, including the debate within the Parliament in 2011, 
the EP’s opinion on first reading, and the EP’s opinion on second reading.  
These documents, or “hard primary sources” as Pollack (2003, 70) calls them, are supplemented with 
journalistic reports.  Simons has argued that the greater number of different kinds of documents (the 
term used more widely in this context, including journalistic reports) the researcher can collect, the 
better the understanding of the overall picture. As she puts it, “one written statement might not mean 
anything, but many of them can add meaning to the context of the study” (Simons 2009, 64).  In the 
context of the EU decision-making, the journalistic reports may “provide additional details regarding 
the preferences and interactions of key actors, particularly in the case of insider publications […], 
which offer detailed, day to day analyses of EU negotiations with comparatively little attention to the 
public pronouncement of major politicians” (Pollack 2003, 71).  
These journals that “provide additional details regarding the preferences and interactions of key 
actors” include magazines such as Euractiv, EuObserver, Europolitics, Financial Times, Reuters, The 
Guardian, The Parliament Magazine and The Telegraph. In addition to these, a statement by one 
stakeholder, Friends of the Earth Europe is included, as well as public statements of two parliamentary 
groups. In total, 19 articles are used to increase understanding of the political context and the actions 
of the institutions. The websites of these newspapers were searched using a key word “GMO”, years 
2010-2015, and relevant information concerning this legislative process was included.    
Both official documents and journalistic materials were searched for clues of the actors’ preferences 
and motivations behind certain actions. The questions asked here are as follows: “are the Commission 
and the Parliament acting in a pro-integration and competence-maximizing manner?”, “is the 
Parliament seeking to ‘green’ the legislative proposal?”. In practice, how this is done is by finding 
out what both the Parliament and the Council are suggesting, and then analyzing these suggestions 
in light of the theoretical framework of the study. From the political issues discussed during the policy 
process, there were four key points of discussion: the grounds on which the ban could be justified, 
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the change of the legislative base of the proposal, the two-step procedure, and a request for making 
GMO-producers liable for the damage they have caused. In addition to these suggestions by the 
Council and the Parliament and the discussion between them, the Commission’s reactions and actions 
in general during the process are also analyzed. 
Moreover, the analysis is not only interested in the suggestions of the institutions, but to some extent 
also in motivations and justifications of the institutions. Why are the Parliament and the Commission 
willing to give powers back to the member state level? What reasons are they giving? Answers to 
these questions were also searched for in the official documents and articles. To give an example, the 
discussion within the Parliament in 2011 revealed reasons behind why the “pro-integration” and 
“competence-maximizing” institution like the Parliament was supportive towards the piece. A matter 
that was brought up several times during the plenary by different political actors was the fact that the 
majority of the European citizens oppose the cultivation of GMOs, suggesting that this might be one 
possible reason for the Parliament’s action. Intuitively, it is natural for a party-political institution like 
the Parliament to pay a close attention to the opinions of the voters. These kinds of motivations and 
explanations for actions were searched for in the official documents to find out why the institutions 
are not acting in congruence with their expected preferences. As the Commission and the Council are 















5. Analysis of the decision-making process of the GMO directive 
 
5.1 Background of the legislation 
 
The legislation process started officially on July 13th 2010, when the Commission published its 
proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and the Council to amend a directive 
2001/18/EC in relation to the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the cultivation 
of GMOs in their territory (European Commission 2010). This chapter provides information as to 
why the European Commission made the proposal and the political environment surrounding the 
legislation process. First, the chapter sheds light on the history of food safety regulation in the EU. 
Second, the chapter provides a brief overview of the US-EU relations as it relates to GMO policy. 
Third, the chapter touches upon the de facto moratorium of GMO approvals and safeguard clauses 
and the main reason as to why the EU set out the directive in the first place.  
 
5.1.1. The US involvement 
 
The reaction of the US has worried the EU institutions from the beginning of the policy process 
studied in this thesis. These concerns are not without a foundation, as there is nothing novel about 
trade-related disputes between the EU and the US.  In the past, there has been disputes over steel, 
tuna, wheat, canned fruit, oilseed, bananas, chicken among other issues. Not only the US, but also the 
EU has been an enthuastic user of the reformed WTO disputes procedure. Most often, the actors have 
been using it against each other (Bretherton & Vogler 2006, 83). 
One particular case is continuously referred to in regards to the legislative process in observation 
here.  In the past, there was an instance in which the EU suspended the exports of GMO corn from 
the USA. First, the American administration at that time was hesitant to challenge the WTO on the 
issue of whether such public health concerns could legitimize protectionism. In May 2003, the Bush 
Administration decided to finally file suit against the EU at the WTO, risking a backlash from 
European consumers (Meunier & Nicolaïdis 2011). As there has already been disputes over GMO 
products with the US, it is possible that the EU will face problems with the US again in this policy 
area. Therefore, the concerns over the reaction of the US towards new legislation on GMO cultivation 
are not unjustified.  
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One of the major causes for the conflicts over the agricultural products has been the different approach 
these countries have taken to the food-related risk governance.  While the EU is known as “the global 
precautionary superpower,” the approach taken by the US is fairly different. The stance of the US is 
that there is not enough scientific evidence that these unorthodox ways of producing food, such as 
treating beef with hormones or GMOs would be bad for human health. Therefore, the US perceives 
the actions of the EU as mainly motivated by protectionism. Since the EU has been unwilling to give 
up on its precautionary approach and the two stakeholders have been unable to settle the dispute 
themselves, the disagreements have led to the dispute settlement processes in the World Trade 
Organization between the EU and the US (along with other actors which have supported the US) 
(Devereaux et al. 2008). 
Yves Tiberghien has characterized the EU concisely as “the global precautionary superpower” 
particularly in this policy field, and that the union has moved away from the initial consensus in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), and instead shifted towards mandatory labelling and strict safety assessments (Tiberghien 
2009, 389). The precautionary principle is one of the guiding principles of environmental policy in 
the European Union and it has also guided the EU’s policy on GMOs.  Critics have argued that the 
approach in the EU is too fearful and that the EU has not given enough attention to the scientific 
arguments which show that the GMOs are safe. To give an example, Claudio Mereu argues in his 
article that the EU institutions should do a detailed examination of both the benefits and risks that 
GMOs present when amending the Directive 2001/18/EC instead of focusing solely on the political 
concerns and risks of the GMOs (Mereu 2012).  
The scholars have aimed at providing an answer as to why the EU has decided to take this stance on 
biotechnology. For instance, Charlotte Burns who has written many papers on the EU’s 
environmental policy has studied the EU’s biotechnology policy in general through the lens of 
historical institutionalism. She has tried to explain what has led to this situation, where biotechnology 
policy in the EU is “mired in controversy and characterized with legislative statis” (Burns 2012, 354). 
Burns argues that there hasn’t been any “subsequent exogenous shock” that has led to this state but 
instead, a relatively small decision early on in the policy’s development has been more important, 
such as the success of the Greens in Germany (Burns 2012).  
The high number of disputes might seem to indicate that the nature of the EU-US relation is 
conflictual. However, this is not completely true. The EU and the US are both partners and rivals on 
the world stage which still share the same core values, many similar policy objectives and history. 
The relation “resists the simple characterization” (Peterson and Pollack 2003, 128). McGuire and 
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Smith have managed to capture quite well the nature of affairs, by characterizing the relations in 
words of “competitive convergence” (McGuire and Smith 2008). In other words, the EU and the US 
have noteworthy similarities, but also they tend to compete with one another. What is good to 
understand when speaking of the EU-US relation, is that the relations take place at various levels, in 
various issue areas and there is a myriad of different actors involved (McGuire and Smith 2008, 1-
5).For instance, in the GMO case, the relevant official platforms are WTO and TTIP negotiations, all 
having to do with the US-EU relations in general.  
It is worth pointing out that the disputes over agricultural products are not the only issues causing 
friction in the EU-US relations. Instead, the literature on transatlantic relations is filled with stories 
of policy failures, tensions in relations and disputes between the two. An example often brought up 
is the Iraq War in 2003, that not only caused tensions in transatlantic relations but also within the 
European Union (see for example Peterson & Pollack 2003, 1-12). However, as Delreux and 
Keukeleire have pointed out, regardless of these problems and even high-level clashes such as Iraq 
War in 2003, “the vast majority of this business continues without incident” (Delreux & Keukeleire 
2014, 275). Therefore, the trade-related disputes over GMO and other agricultural products should 
not be taken as signs of some severe problems between the two actors. Tensions and sometimes even 
disputes are normal in the EU-US relations. However, even a short overview to the history of trade-
related disputes makes the discussion over the GMO directive studied here more understandable: the 
US has already filed suit against the EU at the WTO over GMO issues before, therefore it is possible 
it will do it again. Next, it is time to take a look to the food-related risk regulation in the EU.  
 
5.1.2. Food-related risk regulation in the EU 
 
Food is a necessity for human survival and providing people with nutrients for energy and good 
health. Food is tied with cultural habits and traditions, and is considered an important economic good. 
Furthermore, the food and drink industry is considered one of the most significant industries in the 
EU. As a result, it is naturally important to consumers, producers and public authorities to have 
assurance of food safety and quality. The scholars widely agree that this assurance has suffered in the 
EU because of the BSE disease (often known as ‘Mad Cow Disease’) outbreak in 1996 that revealed 
serious shortcomings in the system for food safety (Vos 2009, 249). The BSE is a disease that spreads 
among cattle through their consumption of contaminated feed.  In March 1996, a connection was 
revealed between a Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease that is fatal for humans and the BSE, and that it is 
53 
 
possible to get the disease by eating meat or drinking milk products from cows having this illness. 
This case highlighted shortcomings of the institutional structures of EU food and other policies on 
risk-related matters and decreased the public trust with the EU (Vos 2009). 
The Commission was one of the main actors that was blamed. One of the accusations was that it had 
given too much consideration to the trade of beef over health and safety protection (Vos 2009). As a 
result, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Commission declared that food safety is its prime interest 
(European Commission 2000). The Commission’s declared commitment to the food safety is 
interesting from the perspective of the long-term preferences of the EU institutions. Is this how a new, 
long-term preference of the Commission was formed? Is a crisis of this magnitude putting food safety 
higher on the priority list for the Commission for an extended period of time? As EU scholars have 
pointed out, the EU institutions are not simply having “competence-maximizing” or “pro-integration” 
preferences. For instance, Hix has noted that in reality, these institutions are having various other 
preferences, such as securing consumer rights and environmental protection to mention few (Hix 
2011). Can it be accurate that the Commission has preferred food safety over its “competence-
maximizing” or “pro-integration” preferences, which explains the result of the legislative process that 
led to the possibility of banning the cultivation of GM crops? We shall come back to these questions 
later in the paper.  
In any case, the BSE scandal raised the question of risk regulation ’to the level of high politics, and 
indeed of constitutional significance’ (Chalmers 2003, 234-8), and generated “extraordinary public 
awareness of food safety issues and widespread public distrust of regulators and scientific 
assessments” (Pollack and Shaffer 2009, 275). This was indicated in a study, which revealed that only 
12 % of Europeans stated that they trusted the public national regulators, compared to 90 % of 
Americans who believed that the US Department of Agriculture’s statements on biotechnology can 
be trusted (Enriquez & Goldberg 2000, 103). According to Paskalev, “it is widely accepted that the 
BSE (Mad Cow) disease and several other prominent food scares in Europe throughout the 90’s lead 
to salience and polarized opinions on what elsewhere appears as a ‘technical’ issue, and to widespread 
aversion to GMOs in Europe” (Paskalev 2012, 190). 
The European opinion polls have confirmed that there is general public unease about food safety 
regulatory institutions. For instance, a special Eurobarometer conducted in 2010 found that 59% of 
respondents disagreed with the statement that GM food is safe for their health and that of their family 
and 61% of them agreed that GMOs make them feel “uneasy” (Eurobarometer 2010). Furthermore, 
Vos argues that “not only citizens, but also Member States have voiced explicit distrust towards the 
European Union and appear increasingly willing to ignore or to disagree openly with EU legislation” 
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(Vos 2009, 251). Member states have more and more started to use either the opt-out provisions of 
the Community’s harmonization measures or the safeguard clauses laid out in the particular directives 
in the field of health, safety and environmental protection, and put higher levels of protection for their 
own citizens (see for example De Sadeleer 2003, 889-915; Zander 2004, 65-79). Examples include 
Italy’s refusal to allow GM maize into its market despite the authorization of the crop by the 
Commission; Austria’s ban of GMO material in its province of Upper Austria which was at that time 
against the general authorization scheme on GMOs laid down in the GMO Directive 2001/18; and 
France’s refusal to implement the Commission’s demand in 1999 to lift the embargo on the export of 
British beef. (Vos 2009, 251.)  
Against this background, the actions of the EU institutions become more comprehensible. It seems 
that within the first ten years while the new authorization system for GMOs has been up and running, 
the Commission has been unable to gain enough trust in the system, as a guarantee of the safety of 
GMO crops. In case the Commission would have pushed for a supranational solution and forced the 
member states to obey, both the majority of European public and a considerable number of member 
states would have likely protested. The positive stand of the European Parliament towards increasing 
the freedom of the member states also becomes more understandable. Using again the terminology 
of the principal-agent literature, acting upon “competence-maximizing” or “pro-integration” 
preferences in this case didn’t make sense to neither of these two institutions. The history of countries 
using “safeguard clauses” also shows the countries that have acted as “environmental-leaders,” in the 
case: France, Austria and Italy.   
In general, within risk regulation literature, scholars have presented different views on what approach 
to take to risks on a societal level. Among these approaches, it is, broadly speaking, possible to 
identify two main opposing camps: rationalists and populists. Rationalists emphasize seemingly 
objective methods such as scientific risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis (see for example 
Sunstein 2002). On the contrary, there are populists who question the complete objectivity of these 
assessments and argue that public opinions, far from being irrational, are simply reflecting a different 
sort of rationality (see for example Winickoff et al. 2005). If simplified a little, the US along with 
other pro-GMO countries such as the UK, the EFSA and a group Nobel Laureates who signed the 
pro-GMO letter could be defined as “rationalists”, whereas the EU, environmental organizations and 
the anti-GMO countries as “populists”.  
Before moving further, it is good to write few words about the EFSA, the European Food Safety 
Authority which has an important role in the GMO authorizations. The EFSA has been criticized for 
pro-industry bias. In December 2011, the EFSA reacted to these claims by adopting new 
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independence policy. This means opening its scientific meetings to public in a pilot project. 
According to Paskalev, this will scarcely change anything because the problem is not solely a matter 
of institutional design. When the EFSA takes into account “all the scientific information available”, 
as it is supposed to, EFSA cannot escape the fact that the information on new technologies comes 
largely from the industry. This is not a problem, which can be fixed under the prevailing regime. 
(Paskalev 2012, 200.) Knowing this reputation of the EFSA is important in understanding the political 
environment surrounding the policy process. In sum, the initiative to amend the directive 2001/18/EC 
as regards the possibility to restrict or prohibit cultivation did not come out of the blue. Instead, there 
has been long-lasting distrust towards the food safety authorities in the EU that has also affected the 
decision-making on GMOs. Next, a short overview is taken to member states opinions on GMOs.  
 
5.1.3 Member states opinions on GMOs 
 
Mühlböck and Tosun have recently studied the voting behavior in the Council in regards to the GMO 
crop authorizations. Importantly to this thesis, their paper also provided information on the member 
states’ current opinions towards GMOs. They found that there were two types of countries: one type 
voted either in favor of the authorization each time (either for or against) and the other type of 
countries demonstrated a more volatile voting behavior. The countries that voted against the 
authorization each time included countries such as Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Luxembourg; 
and the country that voted for the authorization each time was Finland. The remaining member states 
did not follow a recurrent voting pattern, which Mühlböck and Tosun explained by national interests 
that vary over time, for instance because of the shifts in the government’s party composition. 
(Mühlböck & Tosun 2017, 9-10.)  To illustrate the point, we can take an example of France. France 
was first approving of the new GMO crops (Tiberghien 2009, 397), however, this changed after the 
left-wing administration took office in 1997 and France became one of the strongest opponents of 
GMOs (McCauley 2011). 
Whereas some countries have shown some volatility in their stance on GMOs, Austria has been 
relentless in its opposition. Because of the safeguard clauses invoked by Austria and several other 
member states, the United States with other actors have taken the issue of GMO crops to the WTO 
(WTO 2003) which made the Commission suggest that Austria “repeal the temporary precautionary 
measures” as the EFSA did not find any potentially harmful effects (The Council 2006, 20). However, 
the Council showed support to Austria and rejected the Commission’s proposal by qualified majority, 
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as it did already in 2005 in a similar situation, and Austria was able to carry on with its ban (The 
Council 2006, 20). Poland has also put in place bans on GMOs. In 2005-2007, the new-right-
conservative government, and particularly the Ministry of Agriculture, has developed an ambition to 
make Poland and Polish farms stay GMO-free. As Austria, Poland has been ‘an opt-outer’ in GM 
cultivation (Dąbrowska 2009, 213-214). Other countries that have invoked safeguard clauses to ban 
the cultivation of certain GMO crops include Italy and Germany (Vos 2009), which indicates that 
these countries are not very supportive towards GMOs.  
However, there are also countries that have hold a more positive view on the EU. In the UK, 
agricultural biotechnology was for a long time regarded as a solely scientific issue. Debate and 
concerns not resting on scientific proof was rejected as irrational or at most irrelevant (Black 1998), 
and according to Lee, “this narrow framework for decision-making went along with a resistance to 
public involvement” (Lee 2009, 165). This approach was in line with the UK’s approach to decision-
making in technical or scientific policy areas more in general. However, this fairly narrow approach 
applied to GMOs faced difficulties in the changed political environment in the late 1990s. As 
elsewhere, development of agricultural biotechnology received an exceptional level of resistance by 
the public, influencing the major food retailers and processors to avoid carrying GM produce (Lee 
2009, 165). 
The Netherlands has also gained a reputation of being a pro-science country in regards to GMOs. As 
put by Somsen, “the Netherlands has a long-standing tradition as a liberal trading nation, where 
innovative technology and applied research are regarded as crucial for sustainable economic 
prosperity” (Somsen 2009, 187). Naturally following this, Dutch policy on GMOs from the 1980s 
onwards have been guided by the idea that the opportunities provided by modern biotechnology beat 
the possible risks that they may carry (ibid). Spain is cultivating a majority of GMOs in the EU and 
the country is widely regarded as a pro-GMO country. According to EuObserver, the country has 
collaborated closely with the United States to defend the production within the EU (EuObserver 
20.12.2010). However, even though there are certain pro-GMO countries within the EU, the majority 
of the member states hold a pretty reluctant stance towards GMOs (Poli 2015). After this directive 
entered into force in 2015, more than half of the EU member states have opted out of GMO culture 
(Euractiv 2.10.2015).  
As the rapporteur for the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural development put it 
during the plenary, “the Commission proposal, of course, is not about whether you are pro-GM or 
anti-GM” (European Parliament 2011, 31).  Due to this, studying the member states’ preferences and 
identifying laggards proved to be difficult. For instance, simply the fact that the country is opposing 
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the proposal does not necessarily indicate the country’s stance on the GMOs. To give an example, 
France can nowadays be identified as an anti-GMO country but it still opposes taking the decision-
making process on the GMOs back to the member state level. As the French Farm Minister, Bruno 
Le Maire, told journalists in Brussels on May 2010 as regards the policy process I am studying here: 
"We hope that decisions will continue to be taken at community level. We don't support the re-
nationalization of (GM) decisions” (Reuters 13.7.2010). As the sources available gave scarce 
information on the motivations of the countries, the focus is mostly put on the actions of one of the 
‘green’ states, Austria. Next, after this short overview to the member states opinions on GMOs, it is 




The policy process started officially 13.7.2010 when the Commission published its proposal for the 
Directive (European Commission 2010) and ended on 11.3.2015 when both the Presidents of the 
Parliament and the Council signed the final draft. As already discussed in part 2.2.4. of the co-decision 
procedure in this paper, the EU decision-making proceeds in stages. The analysis part follows the 
same order, as the actual policy process did: it proceeds chronologically and is distinguished to three 
main stages: initiation, first phase and second phase. In each stage, the three hypotheses set out in 
section 3.4 will guide the analysis. The stages of the policy process are the following:  
Initiation 
▪ Proposal for a regulation adopted by the Commission on 13.7.2010. 
First phase 
▪ Discussions within the Council or its preparatory bodies on 14.10.2010, 14.3.2011 and 
21.6.2011 
▪ EP opinion on first reading on 5.7.2011 
▪ Council agreement on 9.3.2012 
▪ Adoption of Council’s position at first reading on 23.7.2014 





▪ EP opinion on second reading 13.01.2015 




In short, the policy process was about granting the member states the right to ban the cultivation of 
GMOs in their territory altogether. At first, the EU actors were considering other options than 
allowing a complete ban to solve the issue. It was considered that the EU could stick with the status 
quo and just better implement the existing policies. The Council Conclusions of December 2008 
regarded the legislative framework of GMOs as comprehensive and underlined the need of better 
implementation of the existing provisions, notably concerning cultivation. In addition, the necessity 
of continuing processing applications without undue delays was noted (European Commission 2010, 
2). As a result, the Commission made proposals requesting Austria and Hungary to withdraw their 
national safeguard measures since according to the EFSA, the countries did not have the required 
scientific evidence under the EU legislation. Even though the Council had asked for the stronger 
actions in terms of looking over implementation, in March 2009 the Council rejected the proposals 
by the Commission (European Commission 2010). These early steps appear confusing if one looks 
solely into official documents: first, the Council asks the Commission to implement existing 
provisions better, and after the Commission does so, the Council rejects the proposals of the 
Commission.  
After the Council had rejected the proposals by the Commission, a group of member states made their 
proposal for giving the member states the right to ban the cultivation of GMOs in their territory. In 
practice, this would happen by adding one article to the directive 2001/18/EC. This idea for the 
directive change came from a group of thirteen member states which were Austria, Bulgaria, Ireland, 
Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia 
(European Commission 2010, 2).  
Austria was an important actor getting the issue on the EU’s agenda. On 23 June 2009, Austria’s 
delegation, along with the countries that supported the initiative, sent a document named a Way 
Forward – Information from the Austrian delegations to other member state delegations. The paper 
was supported by Bulgaria, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland and 
Slovenia. This paper included many of the elements of the proposal given by the Commission in 
2010. The paper suggested that the member states should be able to decide on the cultivation of 
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GMOs, for instance based on the socio-economic reasons and this could only be done by slightly 
changing the current legislation (The Council 2009). 
At the request of the Council, the Commission drafted the Proposal for the Directive and sent it to the 
Parliament and the Council. This happened on 13 of July 2010 and it was the official beginning of 
the process. As explained earlier, the Commission is the exclusive agenda setter in legislative decision 
making. It can “decide whether to submit a proposal or not and choose the appropriate moment to do 
so, as the actual content and the wording of the proposal” (Bocquillon & Dobbels 2014, 22). However, 
as it seems to be here, this exclusionary right to act as the agenda-setter “has sometimes been more 
[of] a formal responsibility than a real source of power” (Edwards 2006, 9).  
The policy process was about adding one article to the existing Directive 2001/18/EC on the 
environmental release of GMOs and regulations (European Commission 2010). The member states 
sought for the right to go further than the EU legislation allowed and to ban or restrict the cultivation 
of GMO crops in their territory if they wish, even though the scientific assessment done by the EFSA 
did not show any potential harmful effects. The amendment is not only applying to GMOs authorized 
for cultivation under Directive 2001/18/EC, but also under Regulation (EC) No 1829/2003 “which 
also covers applications for cultivation if they concern GMOs that are intended as source materials 
for furthering the production of food and feed” (European Commission 2010, 6-7).  Even though the 
policy process was about changing something in a directive, the Commission decided to give it in a 
form of a regulation. This was later changed at the request of the Council. 
Before the Commission sent the official proposal, a leaked impact assessment arose suspicion towards 
the aspirations of the Commission. For instance, Reuters headlined an article “Paper reveals EU plan 
to boost GM crop cultivation.” According to Reuters, the EU officials had assessed that proposals 
due to be submitted in June will probably bear a positive impact on biotechnology and seed 
companies, compared to the current situation. Details of the plan, including possibly more widespread 
cultivation of GMOs in Europe, received a “furious reaction from environmentalists,” already angry 
because of the EU’s executive decision to give their approval for commercial growing of a GM potato 
in March. The impact assessment also mentioned that the reaction of the WTO countries to the new 
proposals, especially the US, is one of the key issues for consideration. The assessment also notified 
the importance of biotechnology issues in transatlantic dialogue, and therefore to the US-EU relation 
(Reuters 3.5.2010).  
In addition, the leaked impact assessment also showed that the EU executive was still considering 
other options than this legislative change. Reuter’s article pointed out that the EU executive wished 
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to put an end to the paralysis in GMO crop approvals, by giving the right to cultivate GM crops to 
those countries that wish to do so and sanctioning the “GM-free” stance that some of the member 
states are currently having. In addition, the article notes that the Commission was considering other 
options than revising the current legislation and tries to do the change within the current legislative 
framework, if possible. Trying to do the change within the existing legislative framework would mean 
that the Parliament would not be involved in the process. The Friends of the Earth Campaigner, 
Adrian Bebb, interpreted this as a way to avoid a democratic debate on the matter to please 
biotechnology industry and get the GMO crops into the EU (Reuters 3.5.2010).  
The leaked impact assessment affected the political environment in which the piece of legislation was 
worked on. It arose suspicion towards the Commission’s aspirations. The things that the articles 
implied – that the Commission wanted to give a boost to biotechnology companies, considered going 
harder on the countries with the “GM-free” stance and considers the reactions of the WTO countries, 
maybe even worryingly too much – proved to be slightly unfair accusations.  As was later seen, the 
Commission acted in a very moderate manner throughout the policy process, and there was no 
apparent pro-GMO bias. The reaction of the WTO countries was a shared concern for all the 
institutions, not only the Commission’s, since the beginning of the policy process.   
In the Commission’s proposal, the new Article would enable the countries to “restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of authorized GMOs in part or all of their territories on grounds other than those covered 
by the environmental risk assessment under the authorization system and those related to avoiding 
the unintended presence of GMOs in other products” (European Commission 2010, 6). The important 
part in this proposal and the matter of debate has been the grounds on which the member states can 
be restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of GMOs.  
In its initial proposal, the Commission did not provide any clear grounds on which the ban could be 
justified. The proposal of the directive contained “two series of conditions,” in which the member 
states would be allowed to take measures. The first of them is that the member states can invoke the 
safeguard clause of Directive 2001/18/EC (Article 23) or the emergency measure of Regulation (EC) 
No 1829/2003 (Article 34) “in case they have serious grounds to consider that the authorized product 
is likely to constitute a serious risk to health and environment” (European Commission 2010, 7). The 
second of them is the grounds other than those covered by the environmental risk assessment under 
the EU authorization system. In addition, these grounds have to be consistent with the relevant EU 
treaties and legislation and the international obligations of the EU, especially with the ones 
established under the WTO (The Commission 2010, 7). Also in the preliminary discussions in the 
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Council, the compatibility with WTO rules was also mentioned both times (The Council 2010; The 
Council 2011).   
The Commission’s proposal for the directive, as it stood at this point, did not in fact provide that 
much new compared to the status quo. Already, prior to 2010, the member states were in practice 
allowed to ban the cultivation of GMOs by invoking safeguard clauses. Since the environmental risks 
assessment covered many of the key issues (such as the impacts of GMO crops to health and 
environment), there was not many grounds on which the ban could be justified, or at least, the possible 
acceptable grounds for the Commission were unclear.  
The reaction of the Council and the Parliament to the proposal will be discussed later in the paper. I 
agree with Sara Poli, who argues that the Commission’s reaction to “the intergovernmental call for 
action” can be regarded as positive (Poli 2013, 144). One thing indicating this is the reaction of the 
President of the Commission. Both Barroso and Juncker have been supportive towards the legislative 
change straight from the beginning. In fact, political guidelines for the New Commission in 
September 2009 set out by President Barroso made reference to the principle of subsidiarity in the 
GMO area as an example where the balance may not always be right between an EU framework and 




The proposal was not in line with the expected pro-integration and competence-maximizing 
preferences of the supranational institutions since instead of increasing the EU’s competencies, the 
act seek to decrease them. In this sense, the nature of the act was easy to define. However, defining 
the proposal either as a “pro-environmental” or “anti-environmental” act proved to be a more difficult 
task. First, this task needs to start with the question: is the pro-GMO stance either pro-environmental 
or anti-environmental?  
Mounding consensus in the science community today has increasingly held that the GMOs are not 
more harmful for consumers or the environment than the crops of natural origins; and that opposing 
the use of the GMOs is harmful to the global poor. Probably the most far-reaching study up-to-date, 
the report by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, came to this 
conclusion: GMO crops are not any more dangerous than the crops of natural origin. This conclusion 
was reached after the committee had gone through hundreds of scientific studies about the topic, held 
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a number of public meetings on the topic, read the submissions of information coming from outside 
parties, and lastly, after the investigations of the Committee members and staff (National Academies 
of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 2016).  
In addition, a quite notable number of Nobel Laureates have joined the pro-GMO choir: in total 100 
Nobel Laureates, most of which who have earned their Nobel in related fields such as chemistry, 
medicine and physics, have urged Greenpeace, the UN and Governments to reconsider their stance 
on GMOs. In the letter, the Nobel Laureates argue the same as the study referred to earlier: GMOs 
are as safe, if not safer than the crops of traditional origins (Support Precision Agriculture 2016). One 
of the signatories, a biochemist and molecular biologist Richard Roberts has criticized the EU’s stance 
in particular. In his words, “European politicians support a great deal of scientific research but they 
often do not pay attention to the results if they are ‘politically unwelcome’” (Euractive 9.8.2016). 
Following this, one could argue that the pro-GMO stance is also a pro-environmental stance: GMOs 
often need less pesticides (WHO 2014) and because of that, they are better for the environment since 
no unwanted side effects, such as harm to ecosystems due to the GMO cultivation are not observed. 
Moreover, since the GMO crops would yield better crops, less land would be needed for the farming. 
However, the problem that is often pointed out is that this view in the scientific community is based 
on scientific research mostly funded by the biotechnology companies. Then again, the opposition 
towards the GMOs of the actors usually seen as defenders of environmental interests, such as 
environmental organizations and the Green parties, indicates that the pro-GMO stance could be 
regarded as anti-environmental.  
The anti-GMO line of argumentation tends to claim that it is better to be safe than sorry and that 
GMOs are not necessarily needed to feed the population so why take the risk to use them. This line 
of argumentation connotates with the precautionary principle, which is one of the key principles of 
the EU’s environmental policy. As it is detailed in Article 191 TFEU, the precautionary principle 
means that if an action or policy has a suspected risk of causing harm to the public or to the 
environment in the absence of scientific consensus, the policy or action in question should not be 
pursued. Even though the scientific consensus has increasingly become that the GMOs are not 
harmful, there is still a need for impartial scientific studies funded by non-industrial actors. In 
addition, the studies have not been able to yet to show the long-term effects of GMOs on humans. 
This would make it difficult to reverse the situation once GMOs have started to be cultivated. 
Notwithstanding, I would argue that even though there are increasing opposing view in the scientific 
community, GMOs are still generally regarded as something anti-environmental.  
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The second question is, whether the proposed act is pro- or anti-environmental. The intuitive idea is 
that the proposed act is pro-environmental since it gives the member states a right to go further than 
allowed in the EU legislation and ban GMOs altogether in their territory. However, in practice, the 
outcome of the new legislation might be that more GMO crops are allowed to be cultivated in the EU 
territory since the member states that oppose GMOs would be less eager to hinder the process of new 
GMO crop approvals. This would lead to a situation in which more GMOs would be cultivated in the 
EU area than before the act. Therefore, defining the act itself as pro- or anti-environmental clearly is 
problematic. Should it be defined based on the form in which it currently stands or on the expected 
outcomes?  
In fact, defining the act as either pro- or anti-environmental is not necessary. In this study, the question 
I am interested in is the action of the EU institutions, namely whether the Parliament is pro-
environmental and whether the leader-laggard-dimension explains the dynamics within the Council. 
What is more important than defining the act itself is to analyze how the actors behaved. Did the 
Parliament seek to ‘green’ the Proposal? How did the environmental leaders act? In addition, it is 
worth mentioning that the act was not mainly motivated by environmental concerns. The act seemed 
to be inspired by the principle of subsidiarity. Now, as we have defined the nature of the proposal, 
the next section will focus on the analysis of how this initiation phase appears in light of the study 
questions and the hypotheses set out earlier.  
The first hypotheses focus on the role of the Commission and the Parliament in the process and 
expects them to have pro-integration and competence-maximizing preferences. The initiation stage 
is where the Commission’s role is the most apparent, so this part of the analysis focuses on the role 
of the Commission. The counterintuitive observation has been that the Commission is neither acting 
as a “competence-maximizer” nor “a pro-integration” actor in the policy process. Did the 
Commission, nevertheless, have such aspirations behind the scenes? Can the considerations of other 
options than a legislative change be taken as a sign of that?  Nevertheless, the Commission ended up 
giving the proposal that follows the ordinary legislative procedure and suggested more flexibility to 
member states in their choice over GMO cultivation rather than sanctioning countries seeking to be 
GM-free and adhering with the status quo. Therefore, far-reaching suggestions of the Commission’s 
true aspirations should be avoided, however, the leaked impact assessment is suggesting that the 
Commission might have been slightly less willing to erode the supranational solution than it first 
appeared.  
However, as pointed out earlier, the Commission’s proposal for the Directive did not differ that much 
from the status quo. The two grounds on which the ban of the GMOs could be justified were similar 
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to the situation as it stood at that point: member states could ban the cultivation of GMOs if GMOs 
were posing a considerable risk, which was already possible by invoking safeguard clauses. The 
second ground suggested by the Commission did say that the member states can ban the cultivation 
of GMOs on grounds other than those covered in the environmental risk assessment but did not clarify 
what those grounds would entail in practice. The wording of this part of the Commission’s proposal 
suggested that these grounds had to be well-established: banning the cultivation of the GMOs simply 
because the countries felt uneasy about them did not seem to be a good reason enough – or at least, 
the proposal left open what those acceptable grounds were.  If interpreted this way, the Commission’s 
proposal did not seem to be that far-reaching or differ that much from the status quo. It would simply 
allow member states to legitimately continue what they were already doing.  
However as it turned out later, the Commission did not try to stick with a solution close to the status 
quo, but instead, was open to broadening the grounds on which the ban could be justified 
considerably.  Therefore, the Commission’s behavior can in fact be regarded as counterintuitive even 
though the initial proposal for the directive did not differ that much from the status quo. The question 
that follows is: how can this counterintuitive behavior of the Commission witnessed here be 
explained? 
The literature on the principal-agent model suggests that the agents might not be acting upon their 
true preferences if they are afraid of punishment on the behalf of the principals.  The behavior that 
does not seem to be affected by the principals’ requests, might actually be a result of the agent’s will 
to avoid sanctions. However, in this case, there is a reason to believe there is more to it than the 
Commission’s fear of being punished on the behalf of the member states. Since the beginning, the 
Presidents of the Commission has been supportive towards the initiative and throughout the policy 
process, the Commission has acted more or less like “an obedient servant”. 
As already touched upon earlier, one plausible explanation is that the Commission’s action is part of 
a larger behavioral shift within the Commission in the face of rising Euroscepticism. Instead of 
fearing punishment on the behalf of the principal, the agent here might be afraid of punishment on 
the behalf of the European public. Pro-integration and competence-maximizing action in the current 
atmosphere might lead into unwanted consequences to the process of integration in the long term. 
The basic assumption here is the actor’s rationality: a rational actor would not seek to promote 
integration and increase its competencies in a situation like this.  
Namely, there seems to have been a considerable shift in the behavior of the Commission. The 
Commission has demonstrated “pro-integration” and “competence-maximizing” preferences in this 
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policy sector. In general, the policy on GMOs that the Commission has been pursuing since the early 
1990s is “the establishment of reliable rules for approval that can enable both public support and the 
promotion of biotechnology in the EU (as a research area and as a competitive industry)” (Tiberghien 
2009, 295). The Commission has demonstrated a will to sustain its agenda-setting power relative to 
member states and to broaden EU’s competences over new “novel frontier issues, such as the 
environment and food safety” (ibid). In the past, the Commission determinedly sought to gain trust 
to the authorization system of GMOs. 
The literature on the principal-agent model discusses the potential internal struggles within the 
institutions. It is difficult to tell whether there have been internal struggles on the case within the 
Commission by simply analyzing official documents available in the Eurlex-database; but on the 
outside, the Commission seems to be united on the issue. However, even though internal struggles 
within the institutions would exist, what matters the most is how the institutions are behaving vis-á-
vis each other.  
The second hypothesis handles the pro-environmental preferences of the Parliament. Since the 
reaction of the Parliament is analyzed in the next part as the Parliament gives its position at first 
reading, we can move on to the last hypothesis which is that the leader-laggard dimension among 
member states explains the dynamics within the Environmental Council. In the early steps of the 
policy process, the role of one of the leader states, namely Austria’s, was significant.  
The third hypothesis assumes that the leader-laggard dimension among different member states 
explains the dynamics within the Environment Council. First off, it is good to start with defining the 
member states playing an active role in these early steps. A coalition led by Austria signed the initial 
suggestion for the directive. These countries included BG, IE, EL, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL and SI.  
From these countries, Austria, Cyprus and Greece have regularly voted in the past against the 
authorization of new GMO crops. 
Before 2009, Austria’s strategy was closest to “opt-outer.” This strategy is characterized by an 
indirect pushing, at least from the point of view of the member state. In this scenario, the country is 
not seeking to present its strategy as something that other countries should adopt. The difference 
between this strategy and strategy c is that “national measures in these cases somewhat unexpectedly 
turn out to be out of line with EU measures, something which may lead the member state to opt out.” 
Austria has been motivated to secure a high level of protection in the country against GMOs. Over 
the years it proved to be that the authorization system for GMOs was not reliable enough to Austria, 
which caused it to “opt-out.” The EU legislation was not sufficient enough to gain Austria’s support 
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as it did not guarantee a high level of protection to Austria against the possibly unsafe GMOs. Other 
countries that invoked safeguard clauses may be defined also as “opt-outers.” 
In 2009, Austria’s strategy developed from an opt-outer closer to a strategy called “constructive 
pusher.” It sought to influence the EU environmental policy-making directly by building alliances 
with the Commission’s experts or with other member states. This type of strategy is often referred to 
as the constructive pusher strategy, because it is basically oriented towards finding a compromise, 
possibly at the expense of slightly lower EU standards than domestic ones.  
The laggards in the Council proved to be more difficult to spot in a reliable manner. The documents 
available in the Eurlex-database and the journalist reports available online did give scarce information 
on the member states action within the Council. For instance, it is not enough saying that a country 
has voted either against or for the proposal. Sometimes a country may vote against a pro-
environmental proposal, because it thinks that it is not ambitious enough (Liefferink and Andersen 
1998). Relating to this policy process, both Austria and the Netherlands advocated taking back 
competences to the national level but for completely different reasons: the Netherlands so that it could 
have more of them, whereas Austria to block them altogether (Hristova 2013, 121). Because of the 
resource constraints, I decided to focus mostly on the actions of the ‘green’ member states, and 
especially on the behavior of Austria.  
In sum, the idea for introducing a possibility to ban the GMO cultivation initially came from a group 
of member states. From the start, the Commission’s reaction to this intergovernmental call for action 
has been positive. The next section is comprised of the first phase of the policy process, namely the 
reaction that this piece of legislation evoked within the institutions. 
 
5.3 First phase 
 
During the legislative process, the 
EU institutions discussed both 
technical and political issues. From 
these political issues, it is possible to 
identify four key points of 
discussion. First, the grounds on 
which the ban could be justified was one of them. Second, the suggestion of the Parliament that the 
legislative base of the proposal should be changed from the internal market to the environment. Third, 
The key points of discussion 
1. The grounds on which the ban could be justified 
2. The legislative base 
3. The two-step procedure 
4. The liability requirement for GMO-producers 
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the two-step procedure suggestion from the behalf of the Council. Fourthly, a request for making 
GMO-producers liable for the damage that they have caused. In addition, throughout the process, two 
concerns were expressed on the behalf of all EU institutions: the impacts of the proposal on a single 
market and compatibility with the WTO rules. At first, the proposal was under the form of the 
regulation (European Commission 2010, 8), but from the request of the Council, it was changed to 
the form of a Directive.   
Even though both the Parliament and the Council start discussing the proposal after the Commission’s 
submission, the second step in the co-decision procedure is that the Parliament “adopts its position at 
first reading and communicates it to the Council” (TFEU Article 294). This part of the thesis covers 
“the first phase” of the process, meaning the time span of 2010-2012. During this time, both 
institutions discussed the proposal and the Parliament succeeded to adopt a position at first reading, 
whereas the Council failed to do so.  
 
Discussions in the Council 
 
The Council started officially discussing the proposal on 14.10.2010. The proposal received mixed 
reactions. Some delegations voiced concerns about the possible fragmentation of the Common 
Agricultural Policy and doubts over proposal’s impact on the single market. Others welcomed the 
proposal as a way to respond to public concern over GMO cultivation. In general, many delegations 
had questions regarding the workability of the proposal in practice. Some delegations wanted a 
clarification from the Commission on how “the restrictive measures” would need to be justified in 
order to be compatible with WTO and internal market rules. The paper mentions that as effects on 
human health and the environment are already taken account during the authorization process, and 
therefore, “they must not be invoked by member states” when banning the cultivation of already 
authorized GMOs. The conclusion of the meeting was that the debate and legal analysis of the 
proposal shall continue within the Council (The Council 2010, 7.)  
After the discussion, the Council asked the Commission to provide a list of grounds on which the ban 
could be justified. The Council continued discussions on 14.3.2011 and a number of delegations “felt 
that this list was a good basis for further work on the proposed act”, but on another hand some member 
states requested adding such grounds as “protection of biodiversity”, “socioeconomic factors” and 
“agricultural structures”. In addition, some member states signaled of being unsupportive towards 
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adding “general environmental policy objectives” on the list. Already in the discussion on 14.10.2010, 
the idea was brought up that “As effects on human health and the environment are already considered 
during the EU authorization process for GMOs, they must not be invoked by member states when 
banning the cultivation of GMOs that are authorized for placing on the market” (The Council 2010, 
7).  
This starting point differs from the one that was later taken by the Parliament, since it suggested that 
member states could ban the cultivation of GMOs on other environmental grounds than those 
considered in the authorization process. Put simply, in this preliminary discussion it seemed that some 
delegations in the Council were unsupportive towards the idea of having “environmental grounds”, 
as one ground on which the cultivation ban could be justified, whereas the Parliament was pushing 
for it. However, this idea was only brought up in the preliminary discussions in the Council and it 
was unclear to what extent the whole Council agreed with this part of the document.  
In this initial Proposal for the Directive, the Commission did not give concrete grounds on which the 
member states could ban or restrict the cultivation of GMOs. Instead, it only delimited that the 
grounds should be other than those already covered by the environmental risks assessment under the 
authorization system. The Council requested the Commission to create a list for possible grounds for 
the ban. By the meeting on 14.3.2011 in the Council, the Commission had provided the Council an 
indicative list of reasons that the member states could use to ban the cultivation of GMO in their 
territory. In the meeting, the countries exchanged views on these possible justifications. Also in this 
meeting, some delegations were concerned about the legal compatibility of some grounds in the 
suggested list with WTO and internal market rules. A couple of delegations reiterated their concern 
about the overall workability of the proposal. “Doubts were voiced as to whether a ban could be 
justified on the grounds of general environmental risk assessment. Some said that an overlap between 
the two must be avoided.” (The Council 2011.)   
From the start, the internal divisions within the Council were a prominent feature in this policy 
process. As already mentioned in the co-decision part, the internal divisions within the Council are 
not often known by other actors which gives the Council a leverage over the Parliament. (Costello 
and Thomson 2013, 1037.) In this case, the internal divisions were well-known by other actors. The 





The Parliament’s opinion on first reading 
 
The European Parliament published its opinion on first reading on 5.7.2011. The Parliament 
supported the proposal but introduced a number of changes on the proposal designed to detail the 
grounds that could justify restrictions on the cultivation of GMOs and to better reflect the member 
states’ concerns vis-à-vis transgenic crops. The European Parliament made 28 proposals from which 
the Commission accepted 21. Probably most importantly, the Parliament introduced three grounds on 
which the ban could be justified: environmental impacts, socio-economic impacts and impacts on 
land use, town and country planning. In addition, the Parliament suggested a change of legal basis, 
namely replacing Article 114 with Article 192, to secure the position of the member states.  
In the plenary, the representative of the Commission mentioned that the formulation of environmental 
grounds for the ban was a central point for discussion between the two co-legislators. The important 
issue for the Commission was that these grounds were clearly distinct from those already considered 
in the EU’s authorization system (The European Parliament 2011, 30).  
The legal basis was one of the key points of discussion. The other two institutions rejected the 
Parliament’s idea to change the legal basis. The Commission argued, that “the center gravity of the 
proposal and of the Directive as amended would still remain the smooth functioning of the internal 
market” (European Commission 2014a, 7). Even though the environmental grounds suggested by the 
Parliament would be incorporated to the text, the proposal would still be mainly about improving and 
smoothing the functioning of the internal market, while ensuring protection of the environment. In 
addition, the Directive 2001/18/EC, that was supposed to be changed as a result of this policy process 
was also based on Article 114 TFEU (ibid). As touched upon earlier in the thesis, since the beginning 
of the environmental policy in the EU, the internal market and environmental issues have been closely 
intertwined (Peterson and Bomberg 1999).  
Sometimes it is slightly difficult to define, and a matter of debate, whether the internal market or 
environmental aspect is more predominant. The legal basis remained in the Article 114 TFEU 
(internal market), however, the actors that handled the case were the Environment Committee in the 
Parliament and the Environment Council within the Council. However, since the beginning of the 
policy process, the issue seems to be framed in other means than environmental. As Poli argues, 
“national concerns over the cultivation of GMOs cannot be reduced to the environmental impacts of 
GMOs but to a broader range of concerns that the Directive stresses” (Poli 2015, 563).  
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The Parliament voted in favor of the dossier at the first reading. However, as always, not all political 
groups were satisfied with the piece. Miroslav Ouzký on behalf of the ECR Group criticized Lepage’s 
report on many grounds. For him, it went “far beyond the framework of the Commission proposal, as 
the Commissioner has also emphasized here” and “is clearly motivated by opposition to genetically-
modified organisms (GMOs)” (European Parliament 2011, 34). He also reminded how common 
GMOs nowadays are elsewhere and how “our initial caution may worsen and is worsening the 
position of our farmers on the global market” (ibid). He also requested that as the suggestion gives 
the member states the right to ban the cultivation altogether, it should also grant them right to cultivate 
GMO crops which are unauthorized in the EU. All in all, Ouzký concluded that “I cannot vote for the 
report unless the proposed amendments which slightly liberalize it are adopted” (European Parliament 
2011, 34).  
Ouzký’s request to grant member states the right to cultivate even unauthorized GMO crops and 
nationalize GMO cultivation altogether is fairly interesting. Even though in this policy process, the 
Parliament and the Commission are not acting as “competence-maximizers” and “pro-integration” 
actors as it is expected from them, they are not going so far that they would erode the entire 
authorization system for GMOs and nationalize the decision-making over GMO cultivation. The 
Council hasn’t either pursued eroding the authorization system. Instead, keeping the centralized 
system for authorization has been an interest for all three EU institutions since the beginning of the 
policy process (The Commission 2010; the European Parliament 2011; The Council 2010). Still, after 
this directive change, the authorization of new GMOs for cultivation is done on the EU level even 
though this would not necessarily need to be the case. Even though the Parliament and the 
Commission are not acting in that “pro-integration” and “competence-maximizing” manner as 
expected from them, they could have gone further in their suggestions and suggested the complete 
re-nationalization of the policy regarding GMO cultivation.  
Justas Vincas Paleckis spoke on the behalf of the group. As a group, S&D was supportive towards 
the proposal. Based on Paleckis’ speech, this was due to the following pragmatic reasons: the current 
legislative framework did not fit the needs of the different member states. He referred to the basic 
problems of the status quo: some member states want to give “a green light” to GMOs while some 
would like to give “a red light,” and are currently invoking safeguard clauses to ban the cultivation. 
Paleckis said that “usually our group is a proponent of a Community approach, but in this particular 
case we should not have a one size-fits-all policy” (European Parliament 2011b, 33).  
Kartika Tamara Liotard spoke on the behalf of the GUE/NGL Group. Her speech reflected negative 
stance on GMOs. She argued that “when the member states finally obtain the authority to keep outside 
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their borders this junk – namely genetically modified organisms (GMOs) – that the European Union 
wishes to authorize, it must not be a mere pretense of authority, as it was in the original Commission 
proposal” (European Parliament 2011b, 34).  
Antonyia Parvanova, on the behalf of the ALDE group, supported the piece. She argued that “those 
saying that such an approach would create an obstacle to the European internal market are wrong, 
and they tend to forget that when it comes to such a controversial and still debated technology 
affecting European territories, the landscape, biodiversity and regional specificity, the level of 
discussion should be left as close as possible to European citizens”(European Parliament 2011b, 33).   
It seems that Parliament’s position also pleased environmental organizations, suggesting that it may 
be regarded as pro-environmental. Mute Schimpf, food campaigner for Friends of the Earth Europe 
stated after the vote that “MEPs have today defended the right of European governments to ban 
genetically modified crops” … “This is a clear signal from MEPs that they are on the side of the 
majority of European citizens who oppose GM crops – it is now up to the European Commission and 
governments to make sure safeguards against GM crops are upheld” (Friends of the Earth Europe 
5.7.2011).  
The Council fails to reach an agreement 
 
The Council discussed the proposal on 9 of March 2012. The Council discussed on the basis of a 
compromise text from the Presidency. Although a large number of member states could accept the 
Presidency proposal, it was not yet possible to reach an agreement in the Council. The issues that 
were problematic for the countries were the following: 1. The legal compatibility of some provisions 
in the proposal with WTO and EU internal market rules. 2. How to avoid possible overlaps and/or 
inconsistencies between the mandatory risks assessment at EU level and national environmental 
measures; 3. The implementation of the Environment Council Conclusions adopted on 4 December 
2008 (The Council of the European Union 2012, 11).  
 
The official EU documents do not reveal which countries were against the proposal. According to 
Europolitics, the “blocking minority of France, Germany and Belgium were unrelenting in their 
resistance to compromise proposals drawn by the Danish Presidency” (Europolitics Monthly 3/2012).  
Even though Britain and Spain opposed the paper at first, they later decided to support the Danish 




Out of the four key points of discussion, the grounds on which the ban could be justified was probably 
the most important one. Taken the history of the EU in the WTO trade disputes over agricultural 
products, this is nothing but wise. The WTO rules set out a basis of rules on which these kind of rules 
causing “trade distortions” can be based on.  In short, the WTO rules allow import bans for 
agricultural products on certain grounds. Even in pretty similar cases, the reason why one ban has 
caused problems whereas another ban hasn’t, has been on the grounds of which the ban is put in place. 
For instance, in the hormone beef case, the EU invoked to health reasons which were, however, not 
scientifically proven; whereas in the GMO case, the EU invoked to public morals that it was an 




The first hypotheses focus on the role of the Commission and the Parliament in the process and 
expects them to have pro-integration and competence-maximizing preferences. Even though the 
Parliament did not seem to be a pro-integration and competence-maximizing actor, the Parliament 
was not willing to erode the centralized system altogether. As Ouzký pointed out, the EU could have  
gone further and decide to erode the whole centralized system and leave both the decision to cultivate 
or not to cultivate altogether to the member states. As pointed out earlier, keeping the centralized 
system has been an interest for all three EU institutions since the beginning of the policy process. 
 
As previously mentioned, the Commission did act in a counterintuitive manner in this policy process, 
and so did the Parliament and the question is: why is that? One plausible explanation is simply the 
Parliament’s will to please the voters. The Parliament consists of party political groups. These 
political parties consist of politicians who wish to be re-elected. Therefore, for them, also their natural 
interest is the view of the majority of the European public. The majority of the Europeans are opposing 
the GMOs, so it is therefore natural for the Parliament to be willing to grant the member states the 
right to ban the cultivation of GMOs. However, in general, promoting pro-integration and 
competence-maximizing preferences are against the will of the European public. As known, 
Europarties and the MEPs are in general more enthusiastic towards the European integration than an 
average voter. Therefore, explaining the Parliament’s action by its will to please the citizens is not 
that great of an explanation for its action. Why, in this case, the Parliament would be considering the 
view of the general public when in other issues it has been willing to promote the integration even 




What is also problematic in this explanation is that it is questionable to what extent the MEPs are 
driven by the will to be re-elected. As often mentioned, the EP elections are second order elections 
which are fought on the national rather than European issues (Reif & Schmitt 1980). According to 
Hix (2011, 54-55), due to this and poor knowledge of the voters on what the MEPs are doing in the 
Parliament, there is not much that an MEP can do to increase her chances of re-election. Therefore, 
the actions of the MEPs are less driven by the will to be re-elected than career goals and policy targets 
that can be reached in the Parliament.  
 
Another possible explanation is a more pragmatic one. All the institutions have simply realized that 
there are policy issues that simply cannot be efficiently handled on the EU level. The member states 
have not, after all, been ready for the initiative laid out in the directive in 2001: the member states 
stances on the GMOs are too diverse. The EU needed to take action, because in case the de facto 
moratorium of the new GMO approvals would have lasted longer, the EU would have faced problems 
with the countries through the WTO.  
When it comes to the second hypothesis concerning pro-environmental preferences, the Parliament 
proved to still be an “environmental champion” as expected. The three main pro-environmental 
suggestions it made were the following: liability requirement for the GMO-producers, chancing the 
treaty base and that the ban could be justified on environmental grounds. In the tables below, I have 
classified the ambition level of each suggestion. 
Based on the classification developed by Burns and Carter (2010).  
 
Using the classification by Burns and Carter (2010) the ambition level of this amendment is “a strong 
ecological modernization” since the Parliament suggested applying the polluter pays principle.  
As put in the Article 26c: 
Liability requirements 
The proposal The ambition level of the suggestion 
Liability requirement for the GMO producers A strong ecological modernization 
Changing the treaty base A weak ecological modernization 
The ban could be justified on environmental 
grounds 
A weak ecological modernization 
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Member states shall establish a general mandatory system of financial liability and financial 
guarantees, for example through insurance, which applies to all operators and which ensures that 
the polluter pays for unintended effects or damage that might occur due to the deliberate release or 
the placing on the market of GMOs.” (European Parliament 2011, C33 E/357.) 
In addition, the request to make the GMO producers liable can be regarded as something that would 
have given new competences to the EU because the EU actors would be needed to oversee the 
implementation. In this respect, the Parliament has also acted as “competence-maximizer”. The 
Parliament also suggested changing the legislative base, by replacing Article 114 with Article 192. 
Corine Lepage defended the idea in the following way: 
 
“Secondly, we are proposing a change of the legal basis, namely replacing Article 114 with Article 
192, which is designed to secure the measures taken by the various Member States. The objective 
here is to avoid leading the Member States into decisions that they could not defend in good 
conditions before the courts, should they be taken there by producers of GMOs” (European 
Parliament 2011, 29).” 
Categorizing this suggestion according to the classification provided by Burns and Carter was more 
challenging. Was the impact either neutral, marginal or weak? I ended up defining it as “a weak 
ecological modernization.” If it really gave the member states more security when it came to the 
banning of the cultivation of GMOs, that would be beneficial also for the environment, as I have 
defined the GMOs as anti-environmental. The European Parliament also provided a detailed list of 
environmental grounds on which the ban could be justified. The Parliament stated that the grounds 
should be complementary to those examined during the authorization process and grounds relating to 
risk management. The Parliament provided a list of environment-related grounds that consisted of six 
points. This can also be regarded as an amendment that showed pro-environmental preferences.  
Did the laggards try to hinder the adoption of the piece of legislation? As the pro-GMO stance has 
been defined as “anti-environmental” in this thesis, Spain and the UK can be defined as “laggards” 
as they are pro-GMO. Even though slightly reluctant at first, at the end they supported the compromise 
proposals drawn by the Danish Presidency. The countries that opposed the proposal, France, Germany 
and Belgium, have demonstrated somewhat a reluctant stance on GMOs. Therefore, one cannot make 




5.4 Second phase 
 
It took two years before the proposal returned to the negotiation tables. The Council relaunched the 
discussion over the proposal on 3.3.2014 (The Council 2014). Under the co-decision procedure, after 
the Parliament has adopted its position at first reading, the Council needs to decide whether it 
approves the position. If the Council approves the Parliament’s position, the act is simply adopted “in 
the wording which corresponds to the position of the European Parliament”. In case the Council 
rejects, “it shall adopt its position at first reading and communicate it to the Parliament” (TFEU, 
article 294). The latter was the case this time: The Council did not approve the Parliament’s position 
but instead, adopted an own position on 23.7.2014 (The Council 2014). 
 
The new president for the Commission 
 
In 2014, some noteworthy issues occurred in the political environment. The President of the 
Commission changed from Barroso to Juncker and the new European Parliament was elected. Juncker 
was no less supportive towards the initiative than Barroso. According to Euractive, the selection of 
the Juncker received a negative reaction from the GMO lobby. The chairman of EuropeBio, André 
Goig commented “we believe this will not be positive”, as regards to the announcement of the new 
Commission. One of the reasons that is given to this negative reaction is the fact that the Juncker’s 
Commission proclaimed to be “more political” than its predecessor (EurActiv 11.9.2014).  
Shortly after Juncker took office, The Telegraph wrote an article disclosing that Juncker sacked one 
of the EU’s scientific advisers over her “pro-GMO views” and how this act received a negative 
reaction in the scientific community. For instance, Chief Scientist and WHO representative to the EU, 
DR. Roberto Bertollini, saw this as an action that shows Juncker’s “unwillingness to accept 
independent scientific opinion”. Professor Colin Blakemore and the university of London commented 
that “it’s a sad day for science, policy, politics and the public in Europe” after the incident. According 
to the paper, the final decision to sack the professor, Anne Glover, came after France made clear that 
her pro-GMO opinions were “unacceptable”. In addition, the paper implied that Juncker’s home 
country, Luxembourg, has something to do with Juncker’s reluctant stance towards GMOs. However, 
the spokesman for Juncker denied that Glover was sacked due to political reasons. Instead, she told 
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the Telegraph that “the post automatically ended with the old Commission” (The Telegraph 
13.11.2014).  
 
In this thesis, the focus is mainly on the collective interests and actions of the supranational EU 
institutions. Therefore, the Juncker’s role and causal effects in this case are not being analyzed further. 
In order to know which actors within institutions have influenced the process and how much, the 
analysis of different EU documents would most probably need to be accompanied with interviews 
with EU insiders. All in all, Juncker’s approach to the GMO policy does not seem to deviate much 
from that of his predecessor. In the political guidelines for the new Commission, Juncker stated that 
“I will make sure that the procedural rules governing the various authorizations for GMOs are 
reviewed. I would not want the Commission to be able to take a decision when a majority of Member 
States has not encouraged it to do so” (European Commission 2014b, 16.) Sara Poli believes that his 
appointments have “greatly favored the approval of the new act” (Poli 2015, 562).  
   
 
The Council’s position at first reading 
 
The Council’s position differed fairly much from that of the Parliament. Probably the most striking 
difference was introducing the “the two-step procedure”, which meant that a member state wishing 
to ban a certain GMO crop from cultivation has to communicate first with the notifier/applicant via 
the Commission. This new procedure resulted in heated conversation in the Parliament (Euractive 
20.4.2015) and received criticism on the behalf of environmental groups which argued that it would 
place too much power in the hands of biotech companies (The Parliament Magazine 23.6.2014). 
Before moving on to the discussion over this new initiative, a closer look to this procedure is worth 
taking. In more detail, the proposed procedure would go as follows: 
1. ‘Opting out’ may happen already during the authorization procedure of a new GMO crop or 
renewal of consent/authorization. A Member State wishing to ‘opt out’ sends a request to the 
notifier/applicant, via the Commission, and communicates its request to be excluded from the 
geographical scope in which the cultivation of the GMO crop shall be allowed.   
2. The notifier/applicant can oppose the request. It has a responsibility to communicate its 
opposition to the Commission and the member states.  
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3. If the notifier/applicant opposes, the member state can still either ban or restrict the cultivation 
of the GMO crop, in all or part of its territory after the GMO crop has been approved. The 
position paper presents seven grounds on which the ban can be justified and other factors that 
the member state need to consider when taking the measures (such as conformity with Union 
law). (The Council 2014, 349/5.)  
In a nutshell, this was the content of the controversial “two-step procedure” and the grounds suggested 
by the Council. To provide clarity, a few details are excluded, such as within how many days the 
parties need to communicate their wishes to one another. According to Votewatch, 26 countries voted 
in favor of the proposal. Only Luxembourg and Belgium abstained. Luxembourg was especially 
worried of “the involvement of GMO businesses in the proposed authorization process” and “wonders 
about the balance of power between the Member States, those with smaller administrations, and GMO 
businesses”. In addition, Luxembourg mentioned the public opinion of the country, which is against 
the GMOs and that Luxembourg “will continue to apply the precautionary principle in respect of 
GMOs”. Due to these reasons, Luxembourg delegation was unable to fully support the proposed text 
(Votewatch 2014). The voting results on the Council’s position at first reading corresponded with the 
predominant notion of the Council’s normal ‘culture of consensus’ which refers to the fact that the 
noteworthy number of proposals are adopted either unanimously or with just one or two votes against 
(Heisenberg 2005).  
What exactly made the proposal so controversial and subject to heated conversation in the 
Parliament? Mute Schimpf, the Food Campaigner for Friends of the Earth Europe explains in the 
Parliament Magazine that the paper, as it currently stands, gives power in hands of the biotech 
companies and does not give member states “solid legal basis” on which to justify the ban. The need 
to ask first from the biotech companies would in her words put the countries opposing GMO crops 
“on the back foot against the wishes of the biotech industry”. In addition, she is hinting that the 
political pressure from various sources has pushed the GMO-critical countries to accept this position 
and reminds of the pressure faced by eight member states that already have sought to ban the 
cultivation, coming from the Commission, biotech companies and the US via WTO (The Parliament 
Magazine 23.6.2014).  
Another key issue that has been the matter of debate during the legislative process was the grounds 
on which a member state can justify a ban. According to the Council’s paper, the grounds were the 
following: environmental policy objectives, town and country planning, land use, socioeconomic 
impacts, avoidance of GMO presence in other products without prejudice to Article 26a, agricultural 
policy objectives and public policy (The Council 2014, 349/5). As can be noticed, all three grounds 
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suggested by the Parliament included on the list: environmental grounds, socioeconomic impacts and 
grounds related to land use and to town and country planning. In this respect, the Council’s and the 
Parliament’s position did not differ, however, the Parliament included a more comprehensive 
explanation of each ground. 
 
Towards an agreement between the Council and the Parliament 
 
After the Council published this position at first reading on 23.7.2014 containing this new idea which 
was subject to heated discussion in the Parliament, the two institutions had to negotiate before 
reaching the final agreement. Under the co-decision procedure, the Parliament can approve, reject or 
propose amendments to the Council’s position at first reading. In this case, the Parliament approved 
the text with amendments, which meant that the text amended by the Parliament was forwarded to 
the Council and the Commission, “which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments”. (TFEU, 
article 294.) On 13.1.2015, the Parliament published its opinion second reading in which it was stated 
that as the agreement was reached between the institutions, parliament’s position is the same as the 
final legislative act. The decision of the Parliament was thus “approval with amendments”. The final 
version was signed on 13.3.2015. However, the preliminary agreement was reached already in 
December 2014. (European Parliament 2015).  
Agreement in trilogue On 11 November 2014, the EP's Environment Committee voted on its 
recommendation for second reading (rapporteur: Frédérique Ries, ALDE, Belgium), setting 
Parliament's position for negotiations. Following that, Parliament and Council reached provisional 
agreement on 3 December 2014. Member States would only be allowed to ban GMOs on the basis of 
environmental policy objectives which do not conflict with the environmental risk assessment 
conducted by EFSA. In addition, Member States will be able to invoke agricultural policy objectives 
or other compelling grounds, such as land use, socio-economic impacts, coexistence and public 
policy. In addition to individual crops, Member States would also be able to prohibit groups of GMOs. 
The legal basis of the Directive remained Article 114 TFEU (internal market). Parliament’s request 
to establish a liability regime in case of damage was not retained. As to co-existence, Member States 
in which GM crops are cultivated will have to avoid cross-border contamination by establishing 
buffer zones along their borders with Member States in which GMOs are not grown. Coreper 
endorsed the agreement on 10 December and the EP's Environment Committee on 17 December 2014, 
allowing a vote in plenary to confirm the agreed text (European Parliament 2015). 
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It is challenging to gain information on informal negotiations between the two co-legislators. Huber 
and Shackleton have also observed the problem and argue that there is “a strong case for rebalancing 
the legislative process, given the importance of transparency in making possible informed input, 
debate and participation” (Huber and Shackleton 2013, 1052). They note that this would be as 
indicated in the Treaty of Lisbon, according to which “decisions are taken as openly as possible and 
as closely as possible to the citizen’ (Art. 1 TEU), Parliament and Council “shall meet in public ... 
when considering and voting on a draft legislative act” and they “shall ensure publication of the 
documents relating to the legislative procedures” (Art. 15 TFEU). They present a number of measures 
that can be taken to operationalize these fairy broad objectives such as more public debates between 
the institutions, publishing the Parliament’s mandate for negotiations along with all relevant 
documents and opening up the Council’s COREPER and working groups meetings to web streaming. 
These measures would enable everyone in the EU to observe considerable better the progress of 
legislation, that after all, have a direct effect on the life of every EU citizen (Huber and Shackleton 
2013, 1052).  
This lack of transparency means that what happened in the negotiations between the two co-
legislators cannot be analyzed in detail here. Instead, the analysis is based on the documents available 
in the Eurlex: the positions of the two institutions at first reading, comments of the Commission on 
them and the final version. The relative influence of the institutions is assessed by analyzing these 
official documents available in Eurlex.  This will be done in the “analysis section”.   
 
Reactions in the Parliament 
 
According to Votewatch.com, 480 MEPs voted in favor, 159 against and 48 abstained. GUE-NGL 
and the Greens voted collectively against the proposal. Most of the MEPs in the EFDD abstained. 
ALDE, EPP and S&D voted in favor, yet there were few rebels in each group that either abstained or 
voted against the proposal. Most of the non-attached members voted against the proposal (Votewatch 
2015).  
Elizabeth Köstinger, an Austrian MEP and a member of the European People’s Party (EPP) described 
the debates in the European Parliament as follows: “the debates in the environment committee were 
emotional, to say at least. Every MEP had a personal opinion on the topic, ranging from fierce 
rejection of GMO to avid defense, thereby reflecting a considerable rift between member states’ 
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positions. The Council position, as a basis for discussion, was not to everyone’s taste. In particular, 
its core element, the 2-step procedure that required that ‘applicants’ approval to the member state’s 
demand to opt-out, was subject to heated debates amongst political groups” (Euractive 20.4.2015). 
In the press release in the EPP’s website, Peter Liese, MEP and EPP Group Spokesman on 
environment and food safety comments the piece. He describes it as “a historic breakthrough” and 
that “exaggerated demands of the Greens have been stopped” (EPP press release 2015). It does not 
become clear to what “exaggerated demands” he is referring to: perhaps changing the legislative base 
from internal market to environment or liability requirements to GMO producers. Still, the fact that 
he is mentioning the Greens as important pushers for (probably more environmentally ambitious) 
policy is interesting in the light of the EU literature. Namely, one reason that is given to the pro-
environmental nature of the European Parliament is the activity of the Environmental Committee, 
and especially the Greens in it.   
Even though everyone in the Parliament did not agree with the legislative proposal, the Parliament 
acted in accordance vis-à-vis to other EU institutions: it tried to ‘greener’ the legislative proposal and 
acted to somewhat counterintuitive manner when it came to competence-maximizing and pro-
integration preferences by being willing to grant more freedom to member states and give powers 
back to member state-level. There has been voices within the Parliament, who have also believed that 
the Parliament managed to ‘greener’ the proposal such as a French MEP Gilles Pargneaux (The 
Parliament Magazine 27.2.2015).   
Pargneaux was not completely satisfied with the final version but believed that the Parliament was 
able to enhance the proposal in some notable respects. Importantly to him, in the final version, there 
is no longer the two-step procedure in which the notifier/applicant has a significant role. Pargneaux 
describes this as “one of the greatest victories for the parliament and in future member states will 
have the last word, not Monsanto” (The Parliament Magazine 27.2.2015). As the representatives of 
the environmental organizations, he seemed to believe that the two-step procedure suggested by the 
Council would have given power from the democratically elected representatives to the 
biotechnology companies. In addition, he argues that in the final version, “there is also more security 
for farmers and traditional or organic farming techniques” since within two years, member states are 
going to take actions to prevent traditional crops from contamination by GM crops in border areas. 
He describes the negotiations “long and difficult” and the Council as a negotiator “inflexible”. Even 
though the Parliament was unable to convince member states to change the legislative base from the 
prism of ‘internal market’ to ‘environment’, Pargneaux believes that the Parliament was able to 
‘greener’ the legislative proposal (The Parliament Magazine 27.2.2015.) 
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The Greens voted against the final draft. Green food safety spokesperson, Bart Staes, said: “This new 
scheme will ease the way for GMOs in Europe, whilst failing to respond to the need to address the 
flawed EU procedure for authorizing GMOs. Despite a majority of EU member states and citizens 
being consistently opposed to GMOs, the real purpose of this new scheme is to make it easier to wave 
through EU authorization of GM crops. Countries opposed to GMOs are given the carrot of being 
able to opt-out of these authorizations but the scheme approved today fails to give them a legally-
watertight basis for doing so. This is a false solution” (Euractive 13.1.2015). Also Greenpeace’s EU 
food policy director Franziska Achterberg believed that the Commission is offering EU countries “a 
fake right to opt out that won’t stand up in any court” (Financial Times 22.4.2015).  
Currently, only Monsanto GM maize, authorized in 1998, is grown, mainly in Spain and Portugal but 
also in the Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. Other pro-GM governments, the UK and the 
Netherlands, would like to see many more varieties approved and grown in their soils. But they have 
been frustrated by opponents, such as France, Germany, Luxembourg and Austria, which have 
blocked the qualified majority required in Brussels to give the go-ahead. These countries together 
with Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Poland and Italy have adopted safeguard measures prohibiting the 
cultivation on their territories. Today’s decision means that the 7 GMOs already approved but not 
cultivated in Europe could find their way into European fields as soon as early as next year. Others 




The analysis of Financial Times gives a harsh judgement of the proposal. Already in their title, they 
state that “EU proposal on genetically modified crops satisfies no one”. Significantly, the new 
legislation could further complicate already contentious negotiations between the EU and US over a 
free trade deal. US negotiators had hoped that liberalization of GMO foods could be part of the 
agreement, and have joined with other countries to warn Brussels that such a plan could violate the 
EU’s obligations in the World Trade Organization. Michael Froman, the US trade representative, 
stated he was “disappointed” by the proposal, saying it risked “dividing the EU into 28 separate 
markets” and put the EU-US trade deal at risk. “At a time when the US and the EU are working to 
create further opportunities for growth and jobs through the [trade deal], proposing this kind of trade 
restrictive action is not constructive,” Mr. Froman said (Financial Times 22.4.2015). 
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British Conservatives in the European Parliament called the decision a “cave-in” and said any 
decision should be left to scientific evaluation. “It is a dark day when the EU’s executive is happy to 
sit by and watch its own basic freedoms, trade commitments, farmers and consumers suffer while 
ignoring the scientific advice that taxpayers themselves are paying for,” said Julie Girling MEP, the 
Tory spokeswoman on environmental issues in the European Parliament (Financial Times 22.4.2015). 
The stance of the British Conservatives seem to follow the pro-science, or “rationalist” stance taken 
by the UK in general to the GMOs.  
Statements of the environmental organizations are to some extent indicating how pro-environmental 
the final version was. Greenpeace’s EU unit said the policy would still allow Brussels to authorize 
the import of bioengineered seeds even if a majority of national governments and the European 
Parliament objected. It warned that the EU’s internal market rules, which attempt to harmonize 
standards across the bloc, could supersede the plan if challenged in court. “The Commission is 
offering EU countries a fake right to opt out that won’t stand up in any court,” said Franziska 
Achterberg, Greenpeace’s EU food policy director. Commission officials acknowledged that national 
governments would have to prove “overriding reasons of public interest” in court to defeat a challenge 
to any bans that they imposed.  
After the Directive entered into force, nineteen member states have taken the chance and requested 
opt-outs for all or part of their territory from cultivation GMOs. These member states include Austria, 
Belgium for the Wallonia region, Britain for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. In addition, after this policy process came to a close, the 
Commission gave another proposal that would allow similar opt out of authorizations to place GM 
crops on the market (European Commission 2015). As regards to the GMOs, the process of Brexit 
following the UK’s EU referendum in 2016, has opened up a discussion in the UK over whether the 
country should head for increased cultivation of GMOs once it is no longer subject to the EU 
legislation. To the EU, Brexit has meant that the EU is losing one of the somewhat pro-GMO 
countries, meaning that those whose reaction to the GMOs can be labelled as “rational” are losing 
one of their supporters. Following all this, it is likely that the EU is not going to change its 








As regards to the first hypotheses and the expected pro-integration and competence-maximizing 
preferences of the institutions, after the relaunch of the negotiations in 2014, nothing very noteworthy 
did not seem to happen in this respect. The Commission still acted as an obedient servant and the 
Parliament was still for the granting the right to ban the cultivation. As Pollack puts it, “supranational 
autonomy and influence, … is not a simple binary matter of obedient servants or runaway 
Eurocracies, but rather varies along a continuum between the two points” (Pollack 1998, 218).  In 
this analysis, which is based on the EU’s official documents and media sources, it seems that the 
Commission has acted more as “an obedient servant”.  
When it comes to the Parliament’s green credentials, it did indeed demonstrate pro-environmental 
preferences. It tried to change the legislative base from internal market to environment, get 
environmental grounds as some grounds on which the ban could be based on, get liability to GMO 
producers and make the Council to relinquish the controversial two-step procedure. Even though the 
Council and the Commission did not agree to incorporate all these request, the pro-environmental 
preferences of the Parliament were apparent.  
It is time to address the final question regarding the relative influence of the institutions in the process. 
The Commission exercised power vis-à-vis to the Parliament by blocking its amendments which 
showed considerable environmental ambition. This is in line with the findings of the quantitative 
study by Burns et al. which found out that the European Parliament have demonstrated environmental 
ambition in a number of policy cases and that “The Commission emerged as a central explanation for 
the success of EP amendments and seemed unlikely to support greener amendments, but was less 
likely to reject amendments that are both green and important” (Burns et al. 2012, 952). 
 Namely, the Commission accepted in full, in part of principle or subject 21 of the 28 amendments 
introduced by the Parliament “as it considered that these amendments could clarify or improve the 
Commission’s proposal and were consistent with its general aims” (European Commission 2014a, 3). 
However, it rejected the pro-environmental amendments such as the change to the legal basis, liability 
requirements and referring to the precautionary principle (European Commission 2014a, 7-8), 
mentioned in the amendment 46 that “there is a need for the precautionary principle to be taken into 
account in the framework of this Regulation and when implementing it” (European Parliament 2011, 
C33E/352). As mentioned in the co-decision part of the thesis, some of the most radical views have 
claimed that the Commission’s political power has come close to none after introducing the co-
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decision procedure. While it might be true that the Parliament has gained more power at the expense 
of the Commission, the finding of this study suggests that the co-decision procedure has not made the 
Commission completely powerless.  
Even though the main changes introduced by the Parliament were not adopted by the common 
position, it managed to negotiate a notable change to the final version: there is no notifier/applicant 
system. This suggests that the views of the Parliament do play some part in the Council negotiations. 
However, the final version was more similar to the first position of the Council, than the considerably 
‘greener’ first position of the Parliament. On this evidence, the key player in institutional terms was 






















In creating this thesis, I have conducted a careful case study concerning the policy process that led to 
the right to ban the cultivation of GMOs. In doing so, I have tested hypotheses in relation to: 1. the 
expected preferences of supranational institutions and whether they are acting upon those preferences; 
and 2. the dynamics within the Council. Regarding the first, I hypothesized at the outset that the 
Commission and the Parliament would share a common preference for deeper European integration 
and use their statutory discretion to move policy outcomes in that direction. Furthermore, I 
hypothesized that in addition to these preferences, the Parliament would also have pro-environmental 
preferences upon which it acts. Regarding the second point, I hypothesized that the environmental 
leader-laggard dimension would explain the dynamics within the Council. Put simply, the focus of 
the thesis was on these aspects of the policy process: policy preferences of the institutions and actors 
within the Council, as well as the relative influence of each institution.   
 
By and large, this study does not support the first hypothesis concerning the pro-integration and 
competence-maximizing preferences of the supranational institutions. Yet after a closer look to the 
actions of the Commission, it proved to be slightly less eager to change the status quo considerably. 
For instance, the leaked impact assessment suggested that the Commission might have been slightly 
less willing to erode the supranational system than it first appeared. Furthermore, the Commission’s 
initial proposal for the Directive was not very far-reaching, but rather, the directive suggested an 
option that seemed to be close to the status quo. However, the Commission was willing to broaden 
the grounds on which the ban could be justified, as suggested both by the Parliament and the Council. 
Neither did the Commission seem to seek to use “windows of opportunities” to promote pro-
integration or competence-maximizing preferences. The Commission acted in accordance throughout 
the policy process, and in the vacuum of the runaway Eurocracy to the obedient servant, its role was 
closer to the latter. The Parliament was also supportive towards the proposal from the beginning.  
 
The chosen theoretical framework provided considerable help in making sense of the policy process. 
It proved to be useful and helped to identify the right questions to be asked. According to EU 
literature, how can we expect EU institutions and member states to act? What might be the reason 
they are not acting as expected? This helped to set the focus on the relevant changes in the political 
environment, from the perspective of the institutions, to issues such as the rise of Euroscepticism and 




When it comes to the second hypothesis, the Parliament indeed demonstrated pro-environmental 
preferences in the course of the process. Using the environmental ambition typology designed by 
Carter and Burns (2010), the proposals of the Parliament could either be categorized as “weak 
ecological modernization” or as “strong ecological modernization”.  Even though the Parliament was 
ready to relinquish some competencies designated to the EU, it still acted upon the pro-environmental 
ones. This policy process provided a rare chance to study the actions of Parliament when two expected 
preferences are in conflict. Namely, oftentimes pro-environmental policies also translate to more 
competences to the EU level. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, the field of environmental policy is 
very Europeanized, meaning that the EU legislation is limiting considerably the options available on 
the national level. Therefore, the policy field is very EU-dominated, and a lot of competencies are 
designated to the EU actors. Usually the legislation comes in a form of directive, which allow the 
member states to go further than settled in the directive, if they so wish.  
 
Analyzing the policy process through a prism of leader/laggard dimension proved to be challenging. 
Based on the material (documents in the Eurlex accompanied with journalistic reports), identifying 
the laggards in particular proved to be difficult. However, this theoretical framework helped to 
analyze the dynamics within the Council, especially when focusing on an action of the pro-
environmental member states. This also proved useful when observing the role of Austria in the policy 
process, as it changed its strategy in 2009 from an opt-outer to a constructive pusher and made a 
concrete suggestion to the other delegations for an amendment to the current legislative framework.   
 
In addition to the aforementioned hypotheses, the interest of this thesis is portrayed in the question: 
what was the relative influence of these institutions? The Commission rejected the Parliament’s most 
pro-environmental amendments. The final version seemed to be closer to the common position of the 
Council than the Parliament. Yet the Parliament managed to ‘greener’ the proposal and negotiate it 
show that there is no two-step procedure in the final version. On this evidence, I argue that the Council 
was slightly more powerful vis-à-vis to the Parliament.  
 
Lastly, in regards to the question of what explains the outcome of the legislative process, there is 
considerable evidence in the literature that in the past, the Commission has had an interest for 
competence-maximizing and promoting further integration.  The counterintuitive behavior in this 
case can be a result of various factors. First, one plausible explanation is that the rising anti-EU 
sentiments have made the Commission more cautious in its actions. As pointed out earlier, in the 
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2010s the Commission has made less proposals for new regulation compared to many other years. 
There is also some evidence that in the past, the Commission has acted more cautiously when the 
anti-EU sentiments have been on the rise and thus it is possible that the Commission has taken these 
sentiments into consideration this time around. Put simply, the Commission might not be acting as a 
competence-maximizer or pro-integration in case it senses the strong opposition towards the 
integration project. When the rise of Euroscepticism is accompanied with the general opposition 
towards GMOs, it seems rational from the side of the Commission to not act upon these preferences, 
even though it would still have them. The political environment in which the Commission operates 
seems to have an impact on the Commission’s courage to act upon its preferences.  
 
Second, it is possible that the Commission is no longer having these preferences. At least this 
possibility should not be completely ruled out. The literature on the principal-agent model is not 
giving much attention to the question of where these preferences are stemming from.  It can be 
possible that these preferences change over time when the circumstances change. However, there is 
fairly little reason to believe that the results of the case study would be enough to question the viability 
of the principal-agent model in explaining decision-making in the European Union. Instead of giving 
grounds for questioning the viability of the model, the result of this study could suggest that the EU 
institutions are not acting upon these preferences in every situation.  
 
The literature on the principal-agent model already admits that the agents might not pursue their true 
preferences in every situation. A reason behind it might be that the agent is worried of being punished 
on behalf of the principal. In general, it seemed that was not the only issue facing the Commission. 
The entire political situation seemed rather unfavorable for sticking with a supranational solution. 
Taken the political circumstances around the policy process, it seemed very difficult for the 
Commission to stand for a European solution. Some of the member states were strongly opposing the 
cultivation of GMOs in their territory. According to the polls, the European public strongly opposes 
GMOs. The decision-making on the new GMO crops for cultivating was not working.  It is likely that 
the Commission did not want to put up a battle it could not win. 
 
Overall, the finding of the study is interesting for further research on the relations between EU 
institutions and the preferences of the Commission: it might be that the Commission is not acting 
upon these preferences in a certain political environment. In other words, the Commission might act 
upon these preferences only in certain favorable conditions. Not acting upon these preferences seems 
rational from the side of the Commission in a political environment unfavorable to further integration. 
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Promoting integration further in this particular situation could be counterproductive for the future of 
the European Union and increase the anti-EU sentiments. Therefore, giving in to the 
intergovernmentalism seems to be the rational thing to do in this case even though the long-term 
preferences were contradictory. An interesting pursuit for further studies would be identifying the 
unfavorable and favorable conditions.  
 
In general, it will be interesting to see what happens next in this policy field. For instance, one 
intriguing question is, what will happen in this policy field after Brexit. For sure, the EU will lose one 
of the pro-GMO countries, which likely empowers the anti-GMO camp (“the rationalists”) within the 
EU. On the other hand, after Brexit the UK may pursue its own policies more freely as regards to 
GMOs, which will likely lead to wider GMO cultivation in the country. According to The Telegraph, 
this sort of planning has already started in October 2016 (The Telegraph 26.10.2017). Therefore, after 
Brexit the EU will likely have a pro-GMO country which cultivates GMOs more widely than allowed 
in the EU right next to its border. In theory, the UK could challenge the EU’s strict regulation on 
GMOs through WTO, either alone or by supporting the US. However, it is not very likely in the near 
future, as maintaining a good relationship with the EU is of a top priority for the UK and challenging 
a country through WTO always causes tensions between the stakeholders. In addition, the UK is not 
having as strong biotechnology industry as the US, which would be pushing the UK towards starting 
a dispute over biotechnology products. Therefore, Brexit will likely mean wider changes in the UK’s 
GMO policy than the EU’s.  
 
However, when it comes to the US, the question is not whether here is going to be a new dispute over 
agricultural products between the EU and the US, but rather when. There is a long list of products 
over which the EU and the US have disputed, and the reasons these disputes have occurred have not 
faded away: the approach towards food safety issues remains fundamentally different, which does 
not please the industry in the US as it would like to export more of its products to the EU. The TTIP 
negotiations have been on hold for some time, but if the negotiations are been relaunched, GMOs will 
become again an important topic in the negotiations.  
 
What is pretty sure, is that the EU’s reluctant stance towards GMOs will remain in the near future. 
After the policy process studied in this thesis came to a close, a high number of member states have 
invoked a total ban on the GMO cultivation in their territory. Some major shifts in attitudes would 
have to happen so that the EU as a whole would be more open to cultivation of GMOs. Because of 
the sensitivity of the issue, this policy area might remain a policy sector, in which the EU institutions 
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decide not to take integration further. The policy process studied here was a rare case, in which 
integration took steps backwards, just slightly more than a year before Brexit. These two issues 
showed that integration may take steps backwards: powers may be taken back from the EU level to 
the member state, and a country that has once joined the EU, may also decide to leave.  
 
These two instances should not be taken as signs that the EU is falling apart, but instead, as signs that 
there are other roads than a road towards “an even closer union”. As Juncker has stated in the political 
guidelines for the new Commission (European Commission 2014), probably an open, honest look 
should be taken to EU policies: which issues are better decided on the national level, and which issues 
should be decided on the EU level? The directive 2001 studied here is an example of a case, in which 
the decisions are best made in the national level, as the approach towards the GMOs is so varying in 
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